

**Naming China:
An Analysis of Taiwan's National Day Speeches**

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To Appear: *Journal of Language and Politics*, 2011, 10(3).

In 2001, a Taiwan reporter covering the APEC meeting in Shanghai referred to the People's Republic of China (PRC) as "Chinese communists" (*zhonggong*), prompting this from Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan:

We are in the big Shanghai of the People's Republic of China, and yet you keep calling us "*zhonggong, zhonggong*." Such a term of address I have heard before, but now it has become a historical term and yet it still comes from the mouths of you Taiwanese reporters¹.

This eruption, reflecting hostilities between Taiwan and China, sparked by Taiwan's exclusion from the meeting for the first time since 1993, prompted President Chen of Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), at a press conference next day, to repeatedly call China "PRC" (*zhonghuarenmingongheguo*).

Beginning with Chiang Kai-shek's move to Taiwan after losing the Chinese civil war to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the late 1940s, and his lifelong vow to reclaim the mainland, "China" has served as a key reference point for Taiwan. Names for China have proved especially powerful means to Taiwan's "identity project" through "the infusion of symbols into a shared collective memory" (Laitin, 1998, p. 264). "Bandits" (*gongfei*) from the late 1940s is officially obsolete, yet nostalgic in popular discourse. "Chinese communists" and "mainland" (*dalu*) persist, modified according to changing circumstances. "Opposite shore/both shores" (*duian/liangan*²) from the 1990s reflected increased contact, while "China" changed from meaning Taiwan and China, to more exclusively China. "The PRC," taboo since 1949, entered only after 2000.

Contests over names confront nation-states and are embedded within and simultaneously shapers of history. Name changes reshuffle power through negotiating ideological and political configurations, as names can be made, assigned, and appropriated to suit agendas and mobilize action while being resisted, disputed,

¹ Retrieved 10 October 2004 from *Epoch Times* online edition [19 October 2001]: www.epochtimes.com/gb/1/10/19/n142649.htm

² *Liang'an* is often translated as "both sides"; in this paper we follow the original Chinese character *an*'s meaning--shore--translating it as "both shores" to highlight the implications.

and contested (Bakhtin 1986; Bhatia 2005). Imagined communities constructed and enacted (Anderson 1983) through names are realized recursively, as Taiwanese negotiate their identities through how they view China.

As names change, so do perceptions and construction of political reality (Edelman 1971), particularly when invoked by leaders on official occasions. National Day speeches commemorating the founding of the Republic of China (ROC) are one site to examine these names. Presidents speak for the nation and are sensitive to the names' power to connect with citizens. The government authorizes acceptable usage, endorsed by a divided public and monitored by international observers (Ensink 1997). We examine how naming practices serve as vehicles for Taiwan to manage its identity project (Laitin 1998) through analyzing names for China in National Day 58 speeches by five Presidents from 1949 to 2007; from 1949 to 1974 by Chiang Kai-shek; 1975-1977, Yan Jiagan; 1978-1987, Chiang Ching-kuo; 1988-1999, Lee Teng-hui; and 2000-2007, Chen Shui-bian³.

Names, Political Metaphors, and Identity Construction

Scholars from disciplines such as history, linguistics, discourse and culture, rhetoric, and geography have explored naming practices, focusing on naming locations to proclaim ownership and promote ideology (Azaryahu 1997); the state (Coakley 2009); ethnic groups (Alcoff 2005); and opponents (Bhatia 2005). Names are labels and metaphorical devices providing conceptual casing summarizing complex sociohistorical circumstances (Edelman 1971; Lakoff and Johnson 1980). "...[A] site, a territory or people are first colonised by words and names before being physically occupied by soldiers, trading companies, and statesmen" (Bhatia

³ Chiang Kai-shek's speeches were downloaded from <http://chungcheng.org.tw/thought/default.htm> on 30 January 2006. Speeches by Yan, Chiang Ching-kuo, and Lee for 1988-1992, 1997, and 1999-2000 were downloaded from udndata.com on 20 January 2007. Speeches by Lee for 1993-1996 and 1998 were taken *Collections of Mr. Lee Teng-hui's Discourse* (volumes 12, 14, 16, 18, 20, all published in 2000). Speeches by Chen were downloaded from the ROC Presidential Office's site on 10 November 2008: http://www.President.gov.tw/php-bin/docset/listC.php4?_section=4.

2005: 13-14); "...[T]he very selection of a term...puts invisible boundaries for human perception and suggests attitudes for its evaluation" (Kiewe 1988: 81).

Yet names are more than conceptual frames or political tools; they are grounded in specific times and places, and built into dynamic language embedding contesting voices. Each name drives and is sustained by narratives in the process of "collective remembering" (Wertsch 2002), telling stories, suggesting links with behavior and unfolding events, giving full expression to metaphors. "...[N]ames always invoke specific genealogical or legitimizing narratives, but they are limited by the need to connect with at least some aspects of lived experience" (Alcoff 2005: 400). Once a name is assigned, "...a series of normative associations, motives and characteristics are attached to the named subject" (Bhatia 2005: 8).

Acts associated with collective remembering have to do with complex, varied political/cultural entities famously referred to by Anderson (1983) as "imagined communities." Names, by emerging in a charged environment of conflicting viewpoints, become sites for engagement among an infinite number of participants, each with unique perspectives, interests, and power (Bakhtin 1986; Holt 2004). By being cast into discourse, names automatically enter the lists in struggling for supremacy and survival: they register ideological conflict, legitimize relations, and sustain power differentials (Fairclough 1989).

Taiwan's identity project, however, must consider a unique linguistic environment impinging on how metaphors are conceived, the ground in which names take root and gain substance. Chinese, as a logographic writing system with noninflectional nature (verb forms do not change for persons or tenses, while nouns, singular or plural, maintain the same form), is expressed in concrete shape, impression and sound (P. Chen 1999). Although each single-syllable character encodes phonetic value with meaning, Chinese is hardly monosyllabic--while a "character" has only one syllable, a "word," as a unit of speech, may have more than one syllable and more than one character (P. Chen 1999; J. Liu 1962).

Chinese grammars are flexible and mobile (J. Liu, 1962). "The Chinese language has no grammar that irrevocably fixes and categorizes; that is, it has no parts of speech, number, gender, tense, declension, and so

on" (K. Wu 1989: 247). Subjects or other sentence parts are omitted with no specification of gender, number, tense, or mood (Mair 1994). Almost any word can be a noun, verb, adjective, or adverb, depending on position (Hansen 1989). Since sentences are not especially important in Chinese syntax, clauses or phrases--strings of characters or expressions--are fundamental elements of Chinese composition. Chinese philosophy "treats all words as names and treats compound terms, phrases, sentences, and so on as mere strings of names" (Hansen 1985: 500).

This flexibility makes names effective as tools for political manipulation. Unlike English names that can serve as independent concepts, Chinese characters can form strings of phrases and clusters of images, shortened, extended, and morphed into various other strings of words, or matched to modify and create different meanings. Conceptions thus generated and supported are different, capable of revision to suit political and other needs more conveniently than would be the case with many other languages.

Furthermore, grounded in a strong strain of Confucianism demanding rectification (socially appropriate use) of names Chinese names become supercharged metaphors. One who speaks should be aligned with one's "name"--i.e., one's position vis-à-vis the social hierarchy, since names both designate and constitute the relationship (Blum 1997). Although the Confucian ideal is to ensure mutual alignment of internal foundation and outward expression, political language endorsing external formality aims at establishing hegemonic authority amidst challenges from contesting voices.

The resilience of Chinese in building strings of words and forming clusters of images solidifies a name's essence while allowing it to expand. Names for China have evolved through idiosyncratic contexts, intertwining among multiple layers, burdened with historical presuppositions. Taiwan, like many states, rely on language in the public sphere, using various symbolic means to secure, establish, and maintain its identity project; beneath such maneuvers is the braiding of language, ideology, and identity construction.

Naming China in National Day Speeches, 1949-2007

National Independence Day (Double Tenth, celebrated October 10, tenth day and month) commemorates ROC's founding (1912). During KMT's early rule, this provided a "...yearly occasion for all...to celebrate the success of Xinhai revolution [or Wuchang uprising, the revolution of 1911], which revitalized the Han⁴ ethnicity and built the ROC" (1950). Chiang notes:

The structure of ROC is the protection of people's freedom and rights; the national flag of the ROC is the symbol of revolution; the title of ROC solidifies people's patriotism; the national anthem represents the principle of building the nation with the Three Principles of the People [*Sanmin Zhuyi*]; and the Double Tenth Celebration is to pay homage to the harsh history of Han people's efforts in establishing the ROC. (1949)

National structure (*guoti*), title (*guobao*), anthem (*guogē*), and celebration (*guoqing*) intertwine--and converge on *guo*, nation--marking the transition from the Qing dynasty to a democracy, the first in Asia.

Since the CCP controlled the mainland, early speeches contrasted ROC with the "illegitimate" communist regime which, until recently, could not be named by its official title, the PRC. After the pro-independence DPP won the presidency in 2000 and 2004, and accompanying a rising Taiwanese consciousness, nationalists were increasingly criticized as an "outside regime" and the Double Tenth itself became controversial. As Chinese-consciousness was gradually supplanted, the Xinhai Revolution became irrelevant to some locals and alternative names for China in Double Tenth speeches--"communist bandits," "Chinese communists," "the mainland," "opposite shore/both shores," and "PRC"/"China"--have also been contested.

⁴ The Han group is widely seen as comprising the majority of Chinese, with a bloodline traceable to ancient times. With others viewed as sub-branches of Han, the concept allows nationalists to imply a biological unity for people under the political boundaries of China as a single state developed out of a single race (Barabantseva 2008).

Communist Bandits (*Gongfei*)

"Communist bandits" is based on *fei* (bandits) and prevailed as KMT consolidated rule over Taiwan in the shadow of the Cold War (Cho 2002). A naming policy was formally implemented in 1947 (document number 0744): "The government is now working hard to exterminate the rebellion of the Communists throughout the country. To rectify their name, it is requested that from now on all documents and newspapers, whether internal or external, should address [them] as "*gonfei*."

Speeches by Chiang Kai-shek and Yan Jiagan from 1949 to 1977 use *fei* phrases extensively, supporting a myth of reclaiming the Chinese mainland. This continued as frequency subsided from double to single digits after Chiang Ching-kuo became President. In 1979 and 1980, *fei* is absent, resuming in 1981, appearing two to four times per speech, until disappearing in 1987, the year before Chiang Ching-kuo died and Lee became President.

Fei refers to bandits, robbers, or thieves, extending meanings by attaching characters for leaders, affiliation, and other connections. Communists are "brigands" (*tufei*); "communist bandits" (*gongchang feitu*, *tu*, "disciples"), or "Chinese communist bandits" (*zhonggong feitu*). Mao Zedong is "bandit Mao" (*mao fei*); which leads to "chief Mao" (*mao qiu*, *qiu*, chieftain of primitive tribes); or "thief Mao" (*mao zei*).

The party is the "party of bandits" (*feidang*; *dang*, party); "gang of bandits" (*feibang*; *bang*, gang); or "gang of bandits of Zhu and Mao" (*zhumao feibang*). They are a "nest" or "hideout" (*chao*) breeding thieves who must be exterminated (*jiao*) or sabotaged (*dao*). They formed their "illegitimate bandit regime" (*feiveizhengquan*; *wei*, fake; *zhengquan*, regime) led by the "chief of the bandits" (*feiqin*), leading a "cadre of bandits" (*feigan*; *gan*, cadre).

These "sly bandits" (*jian fei*; *jian*, sly, underhanded) "stole" (*qie*) the mainland, now "fallen into the hands [of bad people]" (*lunxian*; or *lunwang*). They practice "tyranny" (*baozheng*) through slaughter, enslavement, and cheating, producing a "disaster of bandits" (*fei huo*), condemning the innocent to "deep water and fierce

fire" (*suishen huozhe*). The ROC must therefore "exterminate the communists" (*jiao gong*), who are not human, but ferocious rascals (*liao*).

This depiction progresses from communists, to their organization, to consequences of their actions--the CCP embraces terror, violence, and cruelty, making the mainland a place of horror needing rescue. This metaphorical cluster (Jamieson 1992) is fortified by Chinese words, like chemical elements that form compounds (Liu 1962: 46-47). The CCP joined with Russia, betraying the noble Han, their rulers "traitors to the Han" (*hanjian*). According to one slogan, "Han People and Thieves Do Not Stand on the Same Ground" (*hanzeibulingli*). "We as saviors" is set against "them as thieves," as in another slogan, "Extinguish the All-Evil Communist Bandits and Rescue Mainland Fellows from the Same Womb" (*xiaomie wane gongfei, jiejiu dalu tongbao*⁵).

Ironically, after China and Russia split, this rhetoric hardened, perhaps reflecting Chiang's frustration at being unable to reclaim the mainland. The inscription of Chinese communists as Russian allies had to be revised to point to political ideology, becoming violent, aggressive, even irrational: "We know our mainland fell into the hands [of bad people] and the communist bandits won by sheer luck, purely due to their acting as parasites--outwardly they cheat, sew dissension between, and inwardly they seduce, control, pass through, and overthrow..." (1965). This speech had 51 *fei*-names, highest of all speeches.

In 1966, the Red Army is described as "muddled thieves of an evil religion, brigands and roaming bandits, annihilators of humanity, whose evil can never be forgiven." The difference between "Han" and "traitors of Han bandits" was clear: "Loyalty, piety, human-heartedness, love, faithfulness, righteousness, amiability, and peace, are the ever-growing, excellent cultural foundation for our Chinese people. The Boxer Rebellion of 1900 and the bandit Mao's tyrannical cruelty, the disobedient revolt of animal nature and evil

⁵ Aside from speeches at Double Tenth Celebrations, slogans could be found in formal channels such as newspaper cartoons, letters inducting soldiers, and in the text and on inside covers of textbooks, as well as in more mundane settings, such as on surfaces of match boxes, on movie tickets, and even on wedding invitations (Li 1994).

behavior, are just boils with vermin inside" (1966). Chiang called for "extinguishing this Mao chief of roaming bandits and brigands, [sparing] ourselves the pain of long war!" (1967). Similar expressions infuse all speeches, even after the PRC replaced ROC as representing "China" in the United Nations (1971). In his last speech, Chiang shows "bandits" engulfed in internal rivalry and self-destruction (1974).

In the rhetoric about *gongfei*, Taiwan is but a "reclaiming base," a springboard, under American protection, assisting in return to the mainland, engulfed by a yet-to-be-successful ROC. Yan Jiagan continues: "Today we will contrast a humane government ruled by *Sanmin Zhuyi* of our reclaiming base [Taiwan], and the communist tyranny of the mainland area of bandits"; people must "work together to exterminate all-evil Mao bandits, and rescue mainland fellows from the same womb" (1975). In 1977, recognizing China's changing leadership, Yan uses "gang of bandits" (*feibang*) in eight of 21 *fei*-names, framing their actions as destructive purging and cleansing. Chiang's and Yan's rhetoric is formulaic, with slogans and repetition reinforcing the *fei* metaphor. To dispense justice, the nationalists pursue a "sacred" mission infused with emotion and patriotism.

This practice continued in Chiang Ching-kuo's shorter speeches, *fei* appearing in seven out of ten speeches, one to four times per speech. While Chiang continued using "bandits" he focused more on Taiwan and reduced negative portrayals of communists. The goal of the nationalist revolution (1978) was to realize the Three Principles of the People in Taiwan as a model for the mainland: "Today our enemy communist bandits and their tyranny have yet to be eradicated" (1978). After China established ties with America in 1979, Chiang implemented the "three no's" policy: no contact, no negotiation, and no compromise between Taiwan and China, urging citizens to "reverentially fortify the self, and not be swayed in any changing circumstances." Chiang did not use *fei* in his next two speeches. The four appearances in 1981--three "communist bandits" and one "fake bandit regime"--are to object to the PRC's "usurping" history by celebrating the anniversary of the Xinhai Revolution, a ritual ROC deemed its own. As a "model province" practicing capitalism, Taiwan was burdened with the obligation to serve as a standard for other *fei*-occupied parts of China to emulate and its identity continued to connect inextricably to the mainland.

After 1986, as the myth of recovering the mainland gradually faded, "bandits" disappeared⁶. Chiang lifted martial law in 1987, six months before he died. Lee became President in 1988, avoiding the term⁷ and continuing to democratize Taiwan. Lee abolished the *Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion* on May 1, 1991, formally ending designation of the PRC as a "rebellious group" (*panluan tuanti*), a profound action resituating Taiwan in the Chinese polity. He also implemented *Additional Articles of the Constitution of the ROC*, recognizing that China and Taiwan functioned under separate rules. All this led to replacing "bandits" with "neutral" terms like "Chinese communists" and "mainland."⁸

The Mainland (*dalu*)

Throughout these speeches, though nearly vanishing by the mid-1990s, appears the spatial-geographical metaphor "mainland" or "Chinese mainland." Seemingly ideology-free, this name sometimes denotes China, or appears as an adjective with terms designating people (like *dalu tongbao*⁹ and *dalu renming* [mainland people]) or land (*dalu gnotu* [territory of the mainland] and *dalu shanbe* [country of the mainland]). As a place to be redeemed, *dalu* stimulated nostalgia based on Chinese love of land (Fei 1948), and the extended *dalu tongbao* designates people on that land. While ROC distanced itself from the CCP--*gongfei*--it

⁶ Chiang still used the phrase on occasions such as speeches to the united graduation for military schools (Oct. 19, 1987), up to just before his death in early 1988.

⁷ Although Lee never used "bandits" in National Day speeches, he did at other times, such as his speech celebrating the anniversary of the 823 Artillery War (August 24, 1988).

⁸ Aside from these speeches, for example, in school textbooks, "communist bandits" was replaced with "Chinese communists"; "armed forces of the bandits" with "armed forces of the communists"; and so on. Similarly, the Ministry of the Defense revised its name for China. The Chinese communist regime was called "the mainland authority" or "Chinese communist authority"; its armed forces "armed forces of the communists"; and its cadres for the party and military "cadres of Chinese communists." Beginning May 1, 1991, the military ceased chanting slogans about "extinguishing the evil communists" (Jin 1991; Li 1991).

⁹ This phrase could also have several characters inserted, such as "All seven billion *tongbao* in *dalu*" (1966).

attempted to draw closer to people on *dalu*, legitimizing its authority. Despite suggestions of common ancestry, China was distant physically and psychologically, and promoting mainland fellows as blood relatives "from the same womb" encouraged commonality. Reminded of the suffering, innocent *tongbao*, Taiwanese audiences were called to action.

Dalu was often invoked by the three mainland-born Presidents, less by those Taiwan-born--only half of Lee's and one of Chen's speeches contain it. Consonant with *fei*'s prevalence, *dalu* appeared frequently in speeches by Chiang Kai-shek, often in double digits prior to the 1970s. After moving to Taiwan, nationalists depicted "the mainland" as imprisoned behind, in the Cold War image, an "iron curtain" (*teimu*) shielding a location destroyed or having changed color (*biansè*). Positioned as savior, Chiang declared his goals: "...build Taiwan, counterattack the mainland, rescue the entire nation's *tongbao*, and revitalize the ROC" (1950) which, as Roy (2003) says, embraces a quasi-religious spirit: "When we go through the Strait, there is *dalu*! When we move forward over darkness, there is dawn!" (1964).

Chiang took their plight personally: "There is no word to describe my sadness and rage..." (1954). Controlled by thugs, *dalu* was in anguish and torment: "...*communist bandits* have...acted perversely in *dalu*, creating hunger, disease, disasters, and [a] horrifying human hell" (1961; emphasis added). Moreover, "Today our happy land of freedom (*zìyóujìdì*) stands in stark contrast to the hell of the mainland" (1970).

Images of suffering *dalu* were so entrenched that during the Cultural Revolution, the Red Guards, with origins in "fellows from the same womb," were recast in "bandit" terms: "The Mao thief utilizes innocent...children to organize the 'Red Guards,' and commands them to engage in arrogant and blind fights and actions on the mainland" (1966). The Red Guards, who made *dalu* a place of no government, disorder, and failure (1967), are part of an evil ruling gang while *dalu* remains pure and innocent, though temporarily hamstrung.

Dalu tongbao are said to *have rebelled* and are urged *to rebel*. Chiang contrasts the inhumane *fei* rulers with suffering, warm-hearted *tongbao*:

They [other nations] do not know that 98 percent of the six billion people are against and despise the bandits, and are the enemies of the bandits. In fact, they not only do not belong to the sly and fake communist bandits, they are strong preparatory soldiers...for the ROC to fight against the communists and the Russians! (1960)

Yan follows this rhetoric: "[*Dalu tongbao*] have suffered from the exploitation by the communist bandits...can you not risk danger and try to leave such a concentration camp of enslavement and the non-human black hell?..." (1976).

Continuing to emphasize "recovering the mainland," Chiang Ching-kuo dwelled less on events in China and appealed for cooperation. In 1979, he no longer cast China as "bandits" and Taiwan as "savior": "Although our government has left the mainland...in fact, today our hearts and the hearts of the *dalu tongbao* are closely connected and [together, we will] raise the ROC national flag radiating with millions of glorious beams of ethnic renaissance." *Dalu* could be reinvented only if CCP emulated ROC, using "the spirit of the Xinhai Revolution" (1981) and "*Sanmin Zhuyi*" (1983). *Dalu* continues to play a key role in Taiwan's identity project, as *dalu* was imprisoned by communism while Taiwan was enriched by capitalism.

As *fei* lessened after the 1980s, "the mainland," along with "Chinese communist," took center stage in official discourse and *dalu's* nostalgia abated. *Dalu* encapsulates the mission of the Chiangs and Yan, but Lee's *dalu* is a distant other, reinforcing superiority of self. No longer seeing *dalu* as a place to be redeemed, Lee used the name (in eight of 12 speeches) to signify China's failure and elevate Taiwan. In 1988, Lee referred to "the rise of Chinese confidence emerging from the "Taiwan experience," since Taiwan "stands in sharp contrast to the bloody oppression of people for over 40 years on the Chinese mainland." Unlike his predecessors, Lee admits reclaiming *dalu* is a lost cause: "For...40 years, *the Chinese mainland across the Strait* practices communism. Not only have people lost their right to freedom, they also cannot get rid of poverty and underdevelopment" (1988; emphasis added). Lee refers not to "the mainland" but "the Chinese mainland

across the Strait." *Dalu* becomes a geographic marker acknowledging differences in locality, instilling Taiwan with a newfound identity that need not reach out to *dalu*.

Lee directed his remarks not to rulers *or* "suffering" *tongbao*, but both. *Dalu*'s problems should be resolved not by the ROC, but "them," leading Lee to call rulers to action: "Teng-hui has pleaded with the Chinese communists that they should learn the trend and bravely give up the one-party system and implement democracy and a free economic system..." (1990). Lee, then KMT leader, endorsed an anti-communist agenda and unification of China, but did not see himself as "savior" or sympathize with China's backwardness. Lee called on the "mainland authority" (*dalu dangju*) to jettison ideology, reduce gaps in standard of living, and engage Taiwan as an equal (1992). Although China is still not recognized as a state, it *is* treated as an administration that can take action; although people on the mainland are still Taiwan's *tongbao*, they are no longer Taiwan's responsibility.

Dalu gradually changed into a geographic name, devoid of blood-connectedness. While Lee invoked *dalu tongbao* in 1988, 1989, and 1990 (to show connection), 1994 sees a change: "The great accomplishment of rights owned by people, as realized by the ROC in Taiwan, has become the *dalu tongbao*'s unattainable dream, a fact that cannot be denied by the Chinese communist regime."¹⁰ Focusing on establishing Taiwan's independent identity, Lee replaced "ROC" with "ROC in Taiwan," moving beyond the constraints of the "One China Policy" implied in the ROC Constitution.

Dalu lingered through the 1990s. Subsequently, Taiwan has democratized, pursuing self-determination in domestic and international affairs (Tu 1996). At the 1996 Conference on National Development, parties agreed to the "Taiwan first" principle (Chao 2003). "The mainland" became less a

¹⁰ Lee's attempt to refocus Taiwan can also be observed in the revision of one military slogan, from "Abiding by President [Chiang's] dying wish, following the leadership of the government, exterminating all evil communist bandits, and rescuing mainland fellows," to "Abiding by the Three Principles of the People, following the leadership of the government, protecting national security, and accomplishing the great task of unification." Note how the names "communist bandits" and "mainland fellows" were dropped.

romanticized motherland needing redemption and more a place of opposition, even a "disenchanted marketplace" (Tu 1996: 1119).

An open door policy made "opposite shore" (*duian*) and "both shores" (*liangan*) preferred names for Lee and Chen. With its pointed identifier *dui*--opposite--*duian* demarcates collective difference and separation, not the nostalgic *dalu* and *dalu tongbao*. Skipping *dalu* (1995-1997), Lee reiterated in 1998 and 1999 that ROC's success provides a model for the "Chinese mainland." Lee's focus on Taiwan makes transition to Chen easier; Chen used *dalu* only once (2001), noting that the government will "actively promote mainland people (*dalu renshì*) to come [visit]." Instead of *tongbao*, Chen used *renshì* (people), a more respectful, formal, and hence distant, phrase. Preferring *duian* and *zhongguo*, Chen never used *dalu* again.

Chinese Communists (*Zhonggong*)

Another name in Taiwanese identity development is *zhonggong*, shortened from *zhongguo gongchangdang* (CCP). Here ethnicity and nationality are specified (*zhong* for *zhongguo*), as is party affiliation (*gong* for *gongchangdang*, communist party). *Zhong* is sometimes omitted, allowing *gong* to be center of a metaphorical cluster, forming extensions with appended characters, such as *gongdang* (communist party) or *gongchan jituan* (communist group), which practices *gongchan zhuyi* (communism) or *gongchan jiquan* (communist totalitarianism) through its *gongjun gonggan* (communist army and cadres).

Gong-centered names are used most consistently and often, by all Presidents--from 1949 until 2002--although *zhonggong* did not preponderate until the late 1980s. *Gong* transformed from designating a barbaric gang, to an oppositional, ideologically laden political party. Like "mainland," it began in the shadow of *fei*, with *gongfei* naming China. Use of *zhonggong* increased in the early 1980s and was promoted to foremost position by Chiang Ching-kuo as *fei* disappeared in 1987¹¹. In the 1990s, as Taiwan interacted more with

¹¹ See footnote 8.

China, *zhonggong*'s predominance decreased, alternating with *duian/liangan*. *Gong*-related expressions ebbed in 2003, when Chen used only *duian/liangan* to address China, and "China" and "PRC" from 2006 on.

From 1949 to the late 1980s, given *fei*'s supremacy, *zhonggong* seldom appeared alone (except in 1949, 1952, and 1965). It was usually an adjective modifying *bandits*, such as *zhonggong feidang* (Chinese communist party of bandits); *zhonggong feibang* (gang of Chinese communist bandits); and *zhonggong feitu* (disciples of Chinese communist bandits) (1949, 1977, 1984, 1985). At each center is *gongfei*, shortened in all expressions. Chiang Kai-shek excoriated *zhonggong* as a Russian puppet: "The criminal acts of the *zhonggong feidang* have gained pleasure in hurting people and have betrayed the country in exchange for personal benefits" (1949). Of sixteen appearances in 1949, thirteen are with *feidang*. Similar statements appear nearly thirty years later, all the way to 1987.

During this period, while *zhonggong* alone was infrequent, *gong*-related expressions abound in nearly every speech. Led by Mao (*maogong*), *gongfei* produced *gonghuo* (a calamity of communists). Those surrendering to communists were *mei gong* (*mei*, grovel), *kong gong* (*kong*, dread), or *wei gong* (*wei*, fear). The ROC must *jiao gong* (*jiao*, eradicate), lead people to *fanggong kange* (*fan*, against, *kang*, resist and rebel, *e*, Russia; fight against communists and Russia¹²) or *fanggong fuguo* (*fu*, recover; fight against communists and restore the nation), to clean up *gongchan dusu* (poison of communism): "Rescuing the country is above everything, and all is for the sake of *fanggong*!" (1956)

Yan linked Chiang Kai-shek--"Since *zhonggong feidang* stole the mainland, they have done nothing but fight for power inside, liquidate people, and incite class struggle, again and again..." (1977)--to his son--
"*Zhonggong feidang* bets on the legacy of Chinese culture and history--they...have become a source of trouble

¹² Starting in 1957, this phrase was used interchangeably with *fanggong kangbao* (*bao*, violent, brutal) and finally only the latter was used in the early 1960s, as Chinese communists broke away from Russia.

for the whole world" (1984). *Gong* and *fei* often appeared together, depicting a violent, cruel communist gang and the focus is more on the party's brutality (*fei*) than its ideology (*gong*).

This line remains consistent despite reduced negative portrayals of China--from the PRC's separation from Russia in the late 1950s; to ROC's alliance with America to contain communism in the 1960s; to expulsion from the UN in 1971; to Chiang Kai-shek's death in 1975; to Yan's presidency; to Chiang Ching-kuo's "Three No's" policy in 1979; to Chiang's open door policy in 1987 and his death in 1988. Chiang Ching-kuo sums it up: "To love the country, one must *fangong*, and to *fangong* is a sign of loving your country" (1984).

Chiang Ching-kuo promoted the Three Principles of the People against communism more vigorously than his father, elevating Taiwan over the mainland: "We all know the battle of anti-communism and recovering the nation is a battle between *Sanmin Zhuyi* and *Gongchan Zhuyi*" (1984). Note these "principles" are four characters--*Sanmin Zhuyi* versus *Gongchan Zhuyi*--with the last two indicating "-ism." Communism is no longer tyranny by bandits, but an ideology inferior to democracy. Invective is diluted and an alternative offered. The conflict became ideological when *gongfei* disappeared in 1987 and *zhonggong* was rehabilitated. Instead of naming bandits, *zhonggong* simply practiced communism, which the ROC stood against:

The faster the recovering base [Taiwan] develops, the more underdeveloped *zhonggong* appears. Hence, the more effort and progress made by our people and soldiers, the more pressure we will exert on the tyranny of *zhonggong* and the more hope will come to [our] *dalu tongbao*. (1987)

Note the contrast in how the two are put on equal footing in ideological conflicts. Still a "recovering base,"

Taiwan stresses its democracy and political ideology becomes a defining feature for its identity project.

Paradoxically, as Taiwan highlighted its democracy, China gained legitimacy. This is noteworthy, since the elder Chiang stated (1949) that Chinese communists were spies for Moscow's Third International and *not* a domestic political party.

Lee continued Chiang's practice naming China *zhonggong*, but in 1988 added *dangju* (authority) after *zhonggong*, much as he had with *dalü*. "[We] have the right to tell the *zhonggong dangju* that...the country's prosperity and people's happiness can never be accomplished by...rule of dictatorship." Although Lee avoided addressing China as a state, expanding *zhonggong* to *zhonggong dangju* adroitly acknowledges the CCP's legitimacy. Unlike the elder Chiang's and Yan's poses as saving *dalü tongbao*, and Chiang Ching-kuo's seeking cooperation with them to solve ideological conflicts, Lee emphasizes government. Speaking "government to government," Lee accomplishes his goal simply by adding two characters to the name, holding it accountable for good relations with ROC:

Teng-hui has asked *zhonggong* to see the trend, revise its position and discard one-party rule, and instead practice democracy and free economy...it is only on the road of democracy that there is opportunity for us to walk together... (1990)

During the 1990s, *zhonggong* was also often used with or replaced by "opposite shore/both shores." With *liangan* emphasizing Taiwan and China, *zhonggong* must be judged with Taiwan: "As proved by practice and compared to the Taiwan experience...*zhonggong* has lost its position of leadership" (1993). *Zhonggong* was now less demon than defeated opponent, Taiwan having already gained the upper hand.

Zhonggong's full expression *zhongguo gongchangdang* (CCP) contrasts with KMT's full title *zhongguo guomindang*--both share a prefix, *zhong/zhongguo* (China or Chinese), offering opportunity for domestic resolution of disputes. However, *gong* makes it difficult for parties to reconcile--*zhong* ties, *gong* divides. This focus corresponds with long-standing nationalist policy treating Taiwan as part of "China," so the fight was a domestic dispute between *guo* (*guomindang*) and *gong* (*gongchangdang*), summarized in *guogong naizhan* (*naizhan*, civil war). Here, ideology and politics intertwine due to the flexibility of the Chinese language.

Emphasizing party membership, *zhonggong* paradoxically *denies* China's statehood. One editorial distinguished between *zhonggong* and PRC (*Can't Name* 2001). To maintain relations, mainstream Taiwanese

society accepts that "*zhonggong* is not China" and "anti-*zhonggong* is not anti-China." "State" is different from "government," and "government" from "political party." Confusion arises because the PRC government is both tool and target of the communists. *Zhonggong* and China will be differentiated only when the PRC opens.

Zhonggong makes possible the uncertainty of Taiwan's identity struggle, exacerbated by conflict between proponents of unification and independence. This may explain why *zhonggong* continued during Chen's presidency, infrequently at the beginning, until 2002. In his inaugural year, Chen said "verbal attacks and military threats from *zhonggong*" would be a test for his new government (2000). Chen mentions this twice in 2001, citing China's ignoring Taiwan's call for improved relations between "the two shores" (mentioned 11 times). He last used *zhonggong* discussing normalization between "both shores." Although Chen claimed Taiwan extended its good will, "in the face of *zhonggong*'s ever increasing threats and intimidation, and its aggressive campaign to suffocate Taiwan on all international fronts, we harbor no illusions." 2002 also marked the first appearance of "PRC." That Chen jettisoned *zhonggong* and *dalu* for "opposite shore" and "China" reflects DPP's desire for independence, as the bond between Taiwan and China unraveled.

Since *zhonggong* is purportedly more neutral, the foreign minister's agitation noted at our paper's outset seems uninformed (*Can't Name* 2001). This is why Chen discarded a name that fails to acknowledge both sides' status as state. With "opposite/both shores" taking center stage, and "PRC" and "China" replacing *zhonggong* toward his term's end, Chen states that China is a country, not a group of bandits or political party, a position that constructs Taiwan's identity as a state for the first time at the ROC history.

"The Opposite Shore" (*duian*) and "Both Shores" (*liangan*)

Describing spatial separation, "two shores of the Strait" (*haixia liangan; haixia, strait*) is often shortened to "two shores" (*liangan*), with China as the "opposite shore" (*duaian*) and relations "cross-strait relations" (*liangan guanxi*). Taiwan and China occupy "sides" separated by a geophysical barrier. Compared to *gongfei*, *dalu*, and *zhonggong*, all focusing on China, *duian/liangan* implies a balanced, oppositional framework.

Lee introduced this name in 1988, using it throughout his terms, as did Chen, except for 1989, 1991, 2003, and 2005. In 1988 Lee called China "the Chinese mainland...situated across the Strait." In this seemingly realistic depiction of geography, China has yet to be connected to Taiwan. "Two shores" puts Taiwan and China on equal footing, while emphasizing their separation/connectedness. "For over 40 years, the separation of the Taiwan Strait cannot deny the fact that all Chinese are blood connected, and has never changed the will to be re-united by Chinese of both shores..." (1990)

Indications appeared in the *National Unification Guidelines*, a supplement following Lee's implementation of the *National Unification Council* (UNC) in 1991. UNC acknowledges KMT's unification policy, while emphasizing Taiwan and China are "under separate rule" with "the mainland area [*diqu*]" as the PRC, "the Taiwan area" as ROC. Neither is depicted as independent; "two shores" are, literally, "two areas."

This rhetoric continues through Lee's terms. Though "two shores" is a reality, unification depends on China changing. "Both shores" are separated physically and sociopsychologically: "Now the peaceful competition between the two shores has begun..." (1994). Starting from "the faith of Chinese lies in the Taiwan experience" (1988), Lee wants to "manage big Taiwan" (1995)--not "big China"--a phrase from his 1996 victory speech, feting the first direct election of an ROC President in the shadow of China's threats. Earlier, Lee lamented that Taiwanese could not rule themselves, with KMT as much an "outside regime" as Japan was. This positioning presented Lee with a rhetorical challenge, which he mediated by using *liangan* and allowing *liang*--two, both--to challenge the "One China" policy.

Lee called on China to end hostilities, a major step considering KMT's goal of reclaiming the mainland. "We deeply hope that the *zhonggong* will...realistically face the objective fact that *liangan* are under different rules and take active steps to improve the mutual trustworthiness of *liangan*, shorten the distance of *liangan* and open up a new historical phase of 'win-win' *liangan*" (1997). Making Taiwan more than a local

government of the ROC, Lee "froze" the province of Taiwan in 1998¹³.

"Two shores" was upgraded from ambiguously positioned political "areas" under a future "China," to a "special state-to-state relation." In his last speech, Lee notes:

...at present, our country is not yet unified and...*liangan* have their own perspectives about "One China"...we think it is a fact that the relation between the two is a special state-to-state relationship, both historically and legally. (1999)

"One" (China) can only in the future be merged from "two," should such a union even be necessary.

Chen continued prioritizing "both shores" (excepting 2003 and 2005). In line with the "four no's plus one" (*sibuyimeiyou*) pledge from his 2000 inaugural speech¹⁴, Chen's first steps seem tentative:

In cross-strait relations, we are sincere and patient in seeking "goodwill reconciliation, active cooperation, and long-lasting peace." We call on the *leaders of the opposite shore* to join us in returning to the "spirit of 1992," put aside disputes, and resume dialogue and exchange as soon as possible (emphasis added).

Speaking to the leaders instead of the people, the following year Chen continues: "Although the Chinese mainland has not responded positively...we will continue to promote cross-strait reconciliation" (2001).

"Chinese mainland" was soon to be overtaken by "two shores," suggesting a great impasse.

With China unwilling to negotiate, Chen turns sterner: "...Taiwan's sovereignty is inalienable and cannot be infringed upon" (2002), so its identity project is simply to define itself as a state. This was the first

¹³ Currently, Taiwan province is "frozen" (*dongsheng*) rather than abolished (*feisheng*). The word *dong* (to freeze) suggests only a temporary condition. Whether "Taiwan Province"--said to be one among 35 provinces ROC controls--will be abolished (*fei*) remains to be determined.

¹⁴ The pledge has it that, so long as China does not use military force against Taiwan, during his term as ROC President, he would not change the national title, engage in Constitutional reform, declare Taiwan's independence, leave the *National Reunification Guidelines* intact, or hold a referendum to change Taiwan's status.

time China's official title, PRC, was uttered and its threat to Taiwan acknowledged. Unlike Lee, Chen did not endorse a unified China. If "two shores" for Lee is "special state-to-state," for Chen it *is* state-to-state--"two shores" means "Taiwan, China, one country on each side" (*taiwan zhongguo, yibian yigu*), mentioned in a speech in 2002, moving Lee's 1998 "special state-to-state" relations to the "two states" theory.

"Two shores" is not two systems with different histories, but related acrimoniously, since "the *China of the opposite shore* has never given up its goal to annex Taiwan by military invasion" (2006). "Opposite shore" is not a geographical locator but the country "China." This matches "two shores" and "two states," since "...its frame and vision should be elevated to the level of international political and economic situations" (2006). That was reinforced in 2007, as Chen added the official name "PRC" to his repertoire.

"People's Republic of China" and "China"

While informal names proliferated, China's official name, *zhonghuarenmingongbeguo*, was prohibited, since recognizing it as an independent state would violate ROC's claim as China's only representative. It took considerable time--from 1949 until 2002--for "PRC" to be used as a legitimate name for China. None of the KMT Presidents used it and Chen's use seems more provocative than diplomatic.

It first appeared in 1949, when Chiang Kai-shek mentioned the "fake 'People's Republic'"--in line with the 1947 policy, not only was it put in parentheses to indicate special status, "fake" (*wei*) was used as a modifier. Moreover, the first two characters of the full title, *zhonghua* (China/Chinese), are omitted to underscore its illegitimacy. It occurs again in 1950; in 1954, Chiang commented on the communists' program of cultural transformation as attempting to create a Russian empire, "'Russia and People's Republic of China'" (*sue he zhonghuarenmingongbeguo*)--again in parentheses--depicted as a close-knit entity.

In 1961, the name appeared in discussions about China joining the United Nations: "It shamelessly claimed that it will use its puppet 'PRC' to inherit the legitimate position of our ROC." ROC "...not only has no connection with the sly, fake regime of Communist bandits, the so-called 'the PRC'...is a sly, betraying

bandit of the ROC." These rare occurrences prior to 1961 were to censure PRC's culpability, not address it as a political entity. It disappeared until 2002 so for 40 years, the name by which the world knows China was absent from Taiwan's official discourse, a telling commentary on Taiwan's identity politics.

Not only was "PRC" taboo, its short form "China" (*zhongguo*)--a phrase comprising the first and last characters of *zhonghuarenmingongheguo* (PRC) and *zhonghuaminguo* (ROC)--was not used to designate China. The Chiangs, Yan, and Lee used it to mean ROC, supposedly governing all Chinese, even if temporarily hamstrung by the mainland occupation. When Lee became President and attention turned to Taiwanization (Chang 2004) "China" became less a name for Taiwan and more for China.

Frequently cast as "our China" by Chiang Kai-shek, ROC was also called "Free China"--democratic and capitalistic--in contrast to the "lawless" mainland. In 1949, Chiang mentioned "China" 16 times, interchangeably with ROC. He lamented "China's" suffering from Chinese communists and Russia. Russia invaded on many fronts, but "our China is unfortunate to be the first [to suffer]..." This persisted, except that references to Russia were reduced in the early 1960s, disappearing after 1967. The narrative shifted to allying with America to fight the Chinese communists and Yan followed Chiang's narratives. "China" always referred to the ROC, not the PRC.

After Chiang Ching-kuo became President, "China" continued to mean "ROC." In 1981, Chiang popularized a new slogan, "Unifying China by the Three Principles of the People" (*sanminzhuyi tongyi zhongguo*), offered to cure the mainland's melancholy. "China" was not only the ROC's China, but a future, unified China:

...unifying China by *Sanmin Zhuyi* has become the earnest hope of all Chinese in the world...We should...rebuild a new China of peace, prosperity, and balanced fortune under *Sanmin Zhuyi*! (1982)

In 1984 "China" appears thirteen times: "We firmly believe China's suffering will soon pass, and the new China under *Sanmin Zhuyi* will appear..." Until Chiang's death, "China" was bereft, needing revitalization. "China" embraces people in Taiwan and China as an undifferentiated entity.

With Lee, the name changed. In his first speech, Lee continued to promote *Sanmin Zhuyi*, mentioning "China" a remarkable 15 times, but split "China" into Taiwan's China and China's China: "We have seen much prosperity and energy surround us...it is the rise of Chinese confidence emerging from the 'Taiwan experience.' It provides a lively vision for China's future and also points to a broad path" (1988). In 1989, Lee mentioned "China" 17 times, emphasizing the importance of Taiwan: "Today, the experience and result of Taiwan has become...[the] envy and admiration of the eleven billion *dalu tongbao*..."

While "China" referred to both sides, in 1991 Lee distanced it from Taiwan by legalizing the "One China Policy" through the UNC. "China" became a state to be realized through short-, middle-, and long-term goals and was not equivalent to PRC or ROC, or both together, but a higher order entity. Since Taiwan is connected only to a future "China," Taiwan and China are not the same even if "the blood vessels cannot be disconnected and their fates will always be in one entity" (1991). As Chao (2003) notes, since the 1990s "China" and "Chinese" have been "increasingly regarded as irrelevant or even 'alien' to the people of Taiwan" (p. 291). This maneuvering of the name "China" by destabilizing its stronghold in ROC discourse is no easy task, as ROC "considers the word 'China' a term representing a culture, a nation, and a state" (Wang and Liu 2004: 573)¹⁵. "China" is less the reference point for Taiwan's identity project.

Lee continued, "The split of China, and that [both sides] are under different rules, is the misfortune of the Chinese on both sides. Seeking the unification of China...is our policy that has never been changed and will never will be changed" (1994). Similarly, "The development of politics and economics of the two shores were so

¹⁵ Even after the ROC was expelled from the United Nations in 1971, alternative voices advocating a "multiple-system state" or "one country, two governments," still failed to change the China-centered rhetoric.

very wide" that Lee advocated "Managing Big Taiwan, and Building the New Central Plains" (1995). As "Chinese on both sides" are different, Lee supported the name "ROC in Taiwan" (*zhonghuaminguo zai taiwan*) in a speech to Cornell University that same year. "China" no longer encompassed both political entities, as ROC *is* in Taiwan and rules only Taiwan and several offshore islands.

Since then, appearances of "China" sank to single digits and disappeared from Lee's 1997 speech. In 1998, Lee talked about "gradually seeking the entire China's future unification under democracy," asserting that Taiwan's "China" is different from the PRC's: "...we understand that...our country is not yet unified and that both sides have their own perspectives about 'One China'" (1999). Lee seemed to reluctantly continue endorsing KMT's ideology that ROC represented "China." As focus shifted to Taiwan, he gave lip service to "China" as embracing both Taiwan and China.

The break of Taiwan from China, making "China" the exclusive term, came with Chen's presidency. As Taiwan's first elected "native son" President, Chen symbolized rising Taiwanese consciousness (Chang and Holt 2009). "China" did not appear in his 2000 and 2001 speeches, and *dalu* and *zhonggong* only intermittently. In 2002, Chen first addressed China by its official title, dovetailing that with a call for a referendum two months previous and implementing the referendum law in 2003 to highlight Taiwan's sovereignty (Bullard 2008). Positioning himself as official representative of ROC against the PRC,

I therefore represent all fellows in Taiwan and seriously ask the leader in the PRC to remove all four hundred missiles across the Strait, and publicly announce that he will give up [the idea of] using armed forces to invade Taiwan.

In this array, six times for *duian* and once for *zhonggong*, Chen addresses China as "PRC." Since 2002, *duian* was the preferred name and names like *dalu* disappeared the following year. This Taiwan-centeredness goes beyond Lee: calling China by its official title frames an international relation, thereby advocating Taiwan's sovereignty.

This would be unimaginable if not for rising Taiwanese consciousness. With efforts to de-Sinicize and Taiwanize (Chang, 2004), and given that fewer in Taiwan subscribed to greater Chinese consciousness, "Taiwan" became a viable identity category. Some argued that the PRC should be addressed as either "China" or "PRC," and ROC as "Taiwan," leaving "China" for China¹⁶. Chen's speeches respond to such sentiments. Naming China exclusively as "China" challenges China-centered rhetoric, a provocative act before increasingly dissenting audiences. Although over 80 percent of people in Taiwan endorse Taiwan-centered political identity, only a quarter see Taiwanese culture as different from Chinese culture (Wang and Liu 2004).

"PRC" did not recur until 2007, although "China" appeared one year earlier. In 2003 and 2005, focus was on Taiwan's development, with no mention of China, or even *liangan* or *duian*. In 2006, confronting protesters calling for his ouster over corruption, Chen used "China" and "both sides" ten times each. Chen's determination to make "China" China's name is obvious: "China" was no longer "our China" or "ROC's China" but "their China," in line with Chen's announcement that the UNC "ceased" to function in February 2006, removing the "One-China" policy.

Classifying "the opposite shore" as "China" bolsters a fortified Taiwanese identity. Those identifying as "Taiwanese only" changed from 36.9% just after Chen became President, to roughly 43% by the end of 2007; identification as "both Taiwanese and Chinese" remained at about 44%; and identification as "Chinese only" was much lower, about 5% (Election Study Center 2010).

In Chen's final speech, "China" increased from 11 to 27 times, along with "PRC" five times and "both shores" nine times. These frequencies accentuated distance between self and other, perhaps stimulated because, three weeks previous, more than 140 nations debated in the UN General Assembly Taiwan's application for membership using the name "Taiwan," after fourteen failed bids for membership using

¹⁶ Increasing calls for Taiwan to rectify names (*taiwan zhengming yundong*), initiated in 2002 and promoted by private efforts aided by DPP governmental actions, are in line with demands to dissociate China's impact on Taiwan. These cultural enterprises propose that names with *zhongguo* be replaced with *taiwan*, or at least for the term *zhongguo* to be removed.

"ROC" (General Assembly 2007). Chen replaced "ROC" with "Taiwan," so "China" could be exclusively assigned to the PRC: "Taiwan and 'PRC' are two independent countries that do not belong to each other. This was not only historical fact but is the current situation of Taiwan Strait" (2007). While *duian* prepared for separation, that goal is accomplished by calling China "PRC." For Chen, the more China is named "PRC," the more "One China" is irrelevant and the more Taiwan can assert its independent identity.

Further Thoughts

Names as political metaphors induce collective memories. Together with narratives that sustain these memories, they brought into service to support ongoing identity projects, particularly in light of unique features of the Chinese language, both in its linguistic aspects and people's attitudes toward language.

From 1949, the dream (or obsession) of Chiang Kai-shek to take back the mainland, as well as its revision and abandonment, has permanently configured Taiwan's troubled identity negotiation in its attempts to disentangle its separation/connection with China. Given the disparity in power, linguistic resources have had to be conscientiously marshaled into service. In using these other-focused yet self-referential names, Taiwan must name a distant locale it claims, but does *not* own; it must name an opponent who is not always an opponent, but shares incongruent culture and ethnicity; and it must sort out distinctions between land and people, all while managing a simultaneous push-and-pull with respect the unfolding of world political events.

Gongfei, *zhonggong*, *dalu*, *duian/liangan*, and *zhongguo/zhonghuarenmingongheguo*, and their related expressions, manifest themselves and claim different semantic territories in Taiwan's identity project. Chiang and Yan disparaged China as "bandits," vowing to rescue those on the "mainland." Chiang Ching-kuo, acknowledging his father's dream as unlikely, if not impossible, lessened the severity of "bandits" while continuing to deny that "Chinese communists"-ruled China was a government. Under Lee, "communist bandits" vanished; keeping "Chinese communists" and "mainland" at bay, Lee articulated an oppositional discourse by popularizing "opposite shore/both shores." With Chen, "opposite shore/both shores" became

common; "China" and "PRC" represented the PRC; and "mainland" and "Chinese communists" faded into disuse. They maneuvered and appropriated different names to suit their political agendas and stimulated action in changing situations, as Taiwan moved from KMT rule to DPP (and back to KMT in 2008); from authoritarian regime to removal of martial law; and from no contact with China to "open door" policies.

While each metaphorical cluster demarcates a specific frame, changing names--from one president to the other, or within one president's discourse--invites alternative identity definitions. In successive uses of these names--at times overlapping--by different presidents, Taiwan's identity seems to have gradually come out from the shadow of China, as it moved from China-focused *gongfei*, *zhonggong*, and *dalü*, to a more balanced *liangan*, and even to "China" as, exclusively, China. Nonetheless, that China was rarely named by its official title continues to construe Taiwan's feud with China in domestic terms, leaving Taiwan's sovereignty unaddressed and its ambiguous identity ongoing.

Nor did the "same" name carry similar implications; each must be situated against a broader sociohistorical context to identify its boundaries. "China" may be the two Chiangs' China; Lee's idealistic, future China; and Chen's "their China." *Dalu* may be populated with blood-connected fellows from the same womb, or could be just a profitable marketplace. It is narratives that give life and meaning to metaphors; as stories change, so boundaries fluctuate. Use of each name can be seen as a heteroglossic incursion into disputed territory involving collective memory subject to change.

Analyzing these multilayered self-other tensions allows us to critically evaluate the link between language and politics in an idiographic linguistic system. While Chen jettisoned the "One China" policy, current President Ma has revitalized it. In his first speech, Ma named China "both shores," avoiding the contentious "China" and "PRC." How these and other names play out in future Presidential addresses remain to be seen as Taiwan continues to unfold its complex political realities and its struggle to define its identity.

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