

Taiwan and ROC: A critical analysis of President Chen Shui-bien's construction of Taiwan identity in national speeches

Hui-Ching Chang^{a*} and Rich Holt^b

^aUniversity of Illinois, Chicago, USA; ^bNorthern Illinois University, USA

Names used to address Taiwan – such as *taiwan* and *zhonghuamingguo* (Republic of China [ROC]) – are symbols defining Taiwan's political realities, each with their own unique historical significance. Since his election in 2000, Taiwan's president Chen Shui-bien has had to alternate between *taiwan* and *ROC* to strike a balance among conflicting ideas about Taiwan's national identity. The act is grounded in complex political discourse dictating that Taiwan must not be seen as separate from the sinic world and simultaneously to respond to steadily rising Taiwanese consciousness. Facing intercessions by the United States and China, as well as ever-present domestic clashes, rhetorical exigency requires the president to fashion unique political discourse concerning what Taiwan is and ought to be. This study explores how these names and related expressions are used in Chen's public addresses to the nation during his two-term tenure from 2000 to 2008, and how their development reflects the struggle over Taiwan's national identity.

Keywords: political symbols; Taiwan identity; presidential speech; naming practices

Introduction

2000 was a monumental year the world over, but nowhere more than in the embattled state of Taiwan, or The Republic of China (ROC, or *zhonghuamingguo*). In 2000 Taiwan elected its first native-born president, Chen Shui-bien, fashioning a peaceful transition from the rule of the Nationalist Party, *Kuomintang* (KMT), which had governed Taiwan since moving from mainland China in 1949. In his victory speech, President Chen (Chen, 2000a) mentioned *ROC* only once and concluded his speech with: 'May Heaven bless Taiwanese people, may Heaven bless Taiwan – our forever Mother!' Chen (2000b) followed with an inaugural speech, 'Taiwan Stands Up: Toward the Dawn of a Rising Era.' After his narrow 2004 re-election, he titled his inaugural address, 'Paving the Way for a Sustainable Taiwan' (Chen, 2004b).

Since assuming the presidency in 2000, Chen has moved the symbol of *taiwan* to the centre and other representations to the periphery, establishing what had been in process for some time: a Taiwan era. In September 2007, the last year of Chen's second term, after failing in 14 bids to become a member of the United Nations under the name *ROC* since 1993, Chen applied under the name *taiwan*. Although the proposal to include an agenda item on Taiwan's membership in the world body was again rejected by the UN General Assembly, the campaign generated significant notice, with more than 140 nations entering into debate during a day-long meeting of

*Email: huiching@uic.edu

the General Assembly (General Assembly, 21 September 2007). This was the first time the 'Taiwan issue' could be a subject of discussion and command so much interest. Domestically, Chen continues to promote 'Taiwan' in the UN, in contrast to the opposing party KMT's promotion of 'ROC' in the UN; both conducted a referendum in March 2008 to seek popular support for their proposals. Although both failed with a low voting rate of about 35%,¹ indicating that Taiwan has yet to reach a consensus about the United Nations (Lu, 23 March 2008), focusing on *taiwan* has nevertheless become a key cross-party theme.

Such a rhetorical move, centralising *taiwan* and treating *ROC* as peripheral, would have been unimaginable during KMT's rule. Following KMT's 1949 retreat to Taiwan after being defeated by the Chinese Communists, and until the late 1980s, Taiwan was considered only a temporary locale in KMT's ultimate goal of reclaiming the mainland. Because the land was considered a province, and the Nationalist government discouraged any hint of Taiwanese national identity (see Cho, 2002; X.-F. Li, 2004), natives of Taiwan were at times considered socio-culturally disadvantaged. The concept of *taiwan* was naturally subordinated to *ROC*, the symbol of Chinese authenticity, a position endorsed by supporters of KMT and its allies, chiefly the People's First Party (PFP) (Hong, 2005).

Yet *ROC* carries the baggage of a half century of KMT rule. For those advocating Taiwan's independence, *ROC* is a reminder of Taiwan's colonisation by the KMT. Moreover, many in the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, since 2000 the ruling party) and the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) argue that the idea of *ROC* has been long abandoned (since 1971) by the international community, when the PRC took over *ROC*'s seat in the United Nations, becoming the only 'legitimate' Chinese country, under United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758. *ROC* was therefore considered unattainable and even non-existent (Chen, Xue, Li & Hu, 2004; Cho, 2002), and that continuing to embrace it would only fall into the trap of China's 'One China Policy', leading some to call for Taiwan to be an independent political entity with its name simply, *taiwan*, while at the same time vigorously promoting de-sinicisation. As Chao (2003) explains, in the 1990s, *zhongguo* and *zhongguoren* have been 'increasingly regarded as irrelevant or even 'alien' to the people of Taiwan' (p. 291).

The struggle between *taiwan* and *ROC* is a fascinating chapter in Taiwan's turbulent history (T.-l. Chen, 2002). *Taiwan*, not being the official title of the country, even though it is used to designate the island state, likely leads to more ambiguity than certainty. *ROC*, as an official title prohibited (most notably by the PRC and even by the United States) on the international stage (Cho, 2002), is often confused with, or in the shadow of, the PRC. As terms to designate 23 million people who live in Taiwan, such names can lead to confusion intense enough to border on dismay, directly pointing to the difficulty in constructing Taiwanese identity.

Should Taiwan be called "'ROC, 'ROC in Taiwan,' ROC (Taiwan),'"' or simply 'Taiwan'? Chen's 2004 articulation of a 'four-stage' theory of the Republic of China illustrates the complexity of Taiwan's naming practices and its national identities. The process began with the establishment of 'ROC in mainland China' in 1912; progressed to the move of 'ROC to Taiwan' in 1949; to the 'ROC in Taiwan' advocated by former president Lee Teng-hui (1988–2000); and finally to the idea that the 'ROC is Taiwan' in 2000. For Chen, Taiwan's use of names reflects compromise, and any variation is simply an expedient (Chiu, 3 August 2005). While it was

intended to bridge the two camps, Chen's theory offends both: supporters of Taiwan's independence were displeased with Chen's continuing endorsement of the ROC, while unificationists accused him of slyly promoting Taiwan's independence under the safety net of the ROC. But the struggle seems to have come to an end with *taiwan* tentatively winning the upper hand in 2007 – thus entering the fifth stage of the theory – and the order has been reversed to 'Taiwan is ROC', and in fact only 'Taiwan' will be needed. The DPP government's effort to promote Taiwan to enter the United Nations has as its slogan simply, 'UN for Taiwan'.

Beneath such political maneuvering, however, lies the intricate intertwining of language, ideology, and identity construction. The rivalry between the 'pan-blue' (supporters of KMT and PFP, both hoping for eventual unification with China and opposing Taiwan's independence), with their endorsed symbols *ROC* and 'Chinese people', and 'pan-green' (members of the DPP and TSU, both advocating Taiwan's independent identity as separate from the PRC and even the ROC), with their endorsed symbols *taiwan* and 'Taiwanese people',² continue to complicate Taiwan's identity politics. Names, particularly in politics, are not labels used at random or for convenience. They are symbols carefully chosen to define identities. Changing names reshuffles political power structures, taming realities within the negotiation of various ideological dispositions and political configurations (Azaryahu, 1997; Galasinski & Skowronek, 2001). Language registers ideological struggle, legitimising specific relations and sustaining power differentials (Fairclough, 1989, 1992).

The leader of a state must be sensitive to the power of names to connect with national consciousness. Since 2000, Chen has had to find middle ground, striking delicate balances among conflicting voices concerning Taiwan's national identity (Chang, 2001a; T.-l. Chen, 2002; Chen et al., 2004; Honowitz & Tan, 2005). While not abandoning his party's advocacy of self-determination for Taiwan by downplaying the symbol *ROC*, he has had to acknowledge dissenting voices and show support for *ROC*, the better to legitimise his title, 'President of the ROC'. Rhetorical exigencies (Bitzer, 1968) require him to fashion unique political discourse by effectively manipulating alternative names. To apply Ensink's (1997) analysis, the oscillation between *taiwan* and *ROC* means Chen's choice of names must be authorised by his party, his utterances acceptable to coalition partners while winning the endorsement of a divided public, all while also being monitored by international power players such as China and the United States, which are deeply involved in Taiwan's identity struggle primarily for geo-strategic reasons (Cook, 2005).

This study follows the approaches of rhetorical studies and critical discourse analysis (e.g., Fairclough, 1989) to explore how the names *taiwan* and *ROC* are used in the president's public addresses commemorating special occasions over the eight years of his presidency. Commemoration is highly ritualised, reiterating what has been performed before. Such speeches are '... clearly irreplaceable because without a representative speech, a commemoration event cannot come to pass' (Sauer, 1997, p. 47). Such addresses are discursive sites where the president's representative function finds its best expression; reconfirms general norms and values to the public; and creates a sense of societal coherence and consensus. They also 'give social collective recollection and experience a public language' that can be used by the audience to express their own experiences (p. 48). They invoke national meanings (Ensink, 1997) and help sustain national memories, their symbolic implications proving particularly important in the nation's identity construction.

Twenty-seven speeches for commemorative events were analysed, including one victory and two inaugural speeches (2000 and 2004); fifteen speeches delivered yearly (two per year except only one for 2007) on National Day (also called Double Tenth Celebration, falling on 10 October, the tenth day of the tenth month); eight speeches delivered yearly on New Year's Day;³ and a speech delivered to celebrate the millennium. These were addressed to the entire nation on important occasions such as marking transition from one elected government to another (as in inaugural speeches); celebrating the birth of ROC (as in speeches for Double Tenth Celebrations); or delineating significant historical moments (as in speeches for the New Year and the millennium).

Rhetoric and naming practices in presidential speeches

Presidential speeches represent a president's public behaviour propagated through various media. They can address actions tangible as well as symbolic and build immediate connections with audiences. Their success can win people, their failure end careers (e.g., Bruner, 2000).

The idea of a 'rhetorical presidency' (Campbell & Jamieson, 1990; Ceaser, Thurow, Tulis, & Bessette, 1982; Tulis, 1987) emerged around the beginning of the twentieth century with American president Woodrow Wilson. The emergence of this view altered the early Constitutional idea of the non-rhetorical resident as 'constitutional officer' or 'head of government', to a rhetorically enabled 'leader of people', in which presidents imitate even the rhetorical model of a campaign.

Despite its departure from governance by actions, but rather through verbally constructed realities, the rhetorical presidency has evolved into a unique institution of governance. Rhetoric through such venues as programmatic speeches exhorting ennobling views has become an important governing tool, since '... presidential speech and action increasingly reflect the opinions that speaking *is* governing' (Ceaser et al., 1982, p. 234) and that the '... word rivals deed as the measure of presidential performance' (p. 236). Presidents may feel pressured to say something to explain their actions, to handle perceived crises, and to affect the mood of the nation. Speeches fitting specific rhetorical styles may even have become more important than addressing concrete situations (Ceaser et al., 1982; Tulis, 1987).

Girded with the prestige of the office, a president is able to set the public agenda sometimes merely by mentioning a policy area without providing any substantive arguments (Cohen, 1995) or by framing a situation as a 'crisis' (Kiewe, 1998; Tulis, 1987). Campbell and Jamieson (1990) note, 'The identity of the presidents as spokespersons for the institution, fulfilling constitutional roles and exercising their constitutional power, gives [their] discourse a distinctive character' (p. 4). The rhetorical presidency is also an effective tool for impression management. To present desirable images to please their audiences, they can change phrasing and speaking style, since '... each speech comprises not only a careful exposition of the speakers' views, but also ... a deliberate expression of the president-public relationship as the speaker viewed it at that moment in history' (Miller & Stiles, 1986, p. 74).

The representative function of presidency also shapes its rhetorical performance (Ensink, 1997; Sauer, 1997). Presidents speak for nations and their words must be confined to the purpose of the occasion. Indeed, utterances 'inevitably show traces of the speaker's search for a representative point of view, acceptable to the nation'

(Ensink, 1997, p. 11). Besides having the authority to ‘govern by words’, presidents are also obliged to sustain established national symbols and meanings. Such utterances may merely clarify or explain decisions already made. To avoid any unreasonably constraining views, choice of words must be kept at the general, less determinant level and be situated with discursive practices such as other speeches, articles, interviews, and so on (Sauer, 1997).

Messages that diverge from what is acceptable – e.g., how the nation views itself with regard to histories, responsibilities, and so on, through collective memories – can incur criticism and negative consequences (Bruner, 2000). Hence, organising audience experiences offers presidents the opportunity to mediate this tension by persuading audiences that they represent their opinions, in order to invoke commitment and unify the interests of politician and audience. ‘[W]hat he wants them to hear is what they want to hear’ is the rhetorical art of political necessity (Paine, 1981, p. 17). This is made more difficult by having multiple addressees – message recipients extend far beyond the immediate audience to include represented groups as well as journalists and other media professionals (Sauer, 1997). Such utterances thus illustrate the contradictory qualities of monologism and dialogism found in all political discourse (Bakhtin, 1986; Holt, 2004). Monologism is represented by the appeal to what is recognized as established cultural values; dialogism is represented by how the president chooses to suggest new courses of action.

One thorny issue in presidential speeches is how names should be used to represent the nation. Since the nation can be conceived of as an imagined community constructed and enacted through various symbolic acts that unite members and mark its boundaries (Anderson, 1983; Branham, 1999; Canovan, 1996), construction of national identity requires one to subjectively see oneself as part of a collectivity. In this process, names assume greater prominence: ‘The very selection of a term . . . puts invisible boundaries for human perception and suggests attitudes for its evaluation’ (Kiewe, 1998, p. 81; see also Azaryahu, 1997; Galasinski & Skowronek, 2001). Names are metaphors embracing elements of style and audience-focused political argumentation. They allow speakers to generate feelings in audiences through subconscious and affective means (de Landtsheer, 1998).

Different terms have evolved through a variety of idiosyncratic historical-political contexts. As these names travel through social life, they draw to themselves specific meanings and strength; reflect and define alternative political ideologies; and participate in the construction of political realities (Holt, 2004). This is particularly the case with names invoked by the president. Cast into social discourse, such names become sites for engagement among an infinitely large number of participants, each with unique perspectives and interests (Bakhtin, 1986). Despite their origin in contested speech and tension in meaning, names endorsed institutionally by the president, backed by legitimate power, become official symbols of a nation. To use various names to construct the ‘greatest common denominator’ to accommodate people who embrace different political ideologies is the rhetorical challenge presidents face in speeches to the nation.

Especially in the case of Taiwan, *ROC* and *taiwan*, even though they are intertwined in multiple layers, represent different national identities and are burdened with their own historical presuppositions. Furthermore, Taiwan’s identity is more than just a domestic issue, since Taiwan’s stance toward independence or

unification may reshuffle political configurations and benefits among China, the United States, and Japan, among others. It is thus difficult, if not impossible, for the president to invent a common denominator that would bring tentative closure to both internal and external audiences.

Taiwan and Republic of China: names in conflict

Due to different expectations about the role played by the president, as well as cultural values attached to verbal behaviour,⁴ presidential speeches in Taiwan – all governmental speeches, for that matter – are often seen as unremarkable. They present formulaic, routine policy statements or even propaganda devoid of new meaning. Almost all earlier presidents of Taiwan have included a significant amount of sloganeering in their speeches. Perhaps this is why even after mass media became more widely available, television stations rarely broadcast an entire speech, airing only small portions in news stories. While the ‘rhetorical presidency’ (Ceaser et al., 1982) in America may still denote the president’s ability to use words to persuade people, in Taiwan this can be more negatively associated with insincere word manipulation.

Recently these circumstances have taken a strange turn in light of Taiwan’s shifting political circumstances. Following the KMT’s loss of the presidency in 2000, complicated by Chen’s controversial re-election in 2004 (won by the narrowest of margins) and the attempt on Chen’s life just prior to that victory, pan-blue supporters have refused to acknowledge Chen’s presidency. Fierce verbal exchanges between opposing parties, particularly in the legislature, have become routine. Ironically, in such a partisan, politically charged atmosphere, presidential speeches, previously ignored, now receive *more* attention. Media opinion leaders, many of whom support KMT, have often paid attention to presidential speeches in order to criticise government policies.

Furthermore, this heightened attention is also triggered by the Taiwanese government’s being under constant scrutiny by spectators such as China and the United States, particularly with regard to issues concerning Taiwan-China relations that might be addressed in these speeches. Since Chen’s tenure, the cross-strait relation has stiffened and soured, as China has increasingly suspected that Chen’s pro-independence platform will eventually be implemented and has hence allied with KMT to keep *taidu* (Taiwan’s independence) in check. The United States, on the other hand, often serves as a mediator between the two, as it simultaneously and paradoxically assists Taiwan’s self-defense while acknowledging the ‘One China’ policy.

Although the role ‘president’ still carries power and prestige, the multifaceted, complex political situation Chen faces seemingly fails to conform to what Miroff (1982) describes as the president’s ability to monopolise the public space. If people in Taiwan look to the president for guidance and leadership, one could easily conclude that only roughly half of the population – the ‘pan-green’ proponents who voted for Chen – seek his guidance. The goal of the ‘rhetorical presidency’ in today’s Taiwan seems less to persuade audiences and move the nation, and more to avoid criticism and seek areas of agreement, not only among people in Taiwan, but also other players in international politics. It not only demands rhetoric that may appease a

divided people but also effective diplomacy that would sustain a delicate balance among Taiwan, China, and the United States.

In such conditions, names for Taiwan are particularly important as symbols of national identity. This has compelled Chen to use idiosyncratic discourse to confront the dilemma over how *taiwan* should be used along with *ROC*. His speeches must be rhetorically designed to be inclusive, thereby achieving, however ruggedly, the 'consensus' standard audiences come to expect (Sauer, 1997). Chen must find ways to mediate contending voices to successfully fulfill his role as representative, even on ritualised occasions where few give much credence to speech contents. This recalls the effortful melding by speaker and listener of divergent worldviews that Holt (2004) argues infuses every human utterance; each utterance is achieved by the 'forced marriage' of widely divergent views of the world and hence displays a unity and coherence that is illusory. Even absent unity in Taiwan (Chuang, 2001; T.-I. Chen, 2002; B.-y. Chang, 2004) 'we' can be defined rhetorically and joint action made possible (Paine, 1981).

To analyse these multiplex forces let us first turn to some basic statistics concerning occurrences of *taiwan* and *ROC* in Chen's speeches from 2000 to 2008^{5,6} (see Table 1), as well as the contexts in which they are introduced.

Except for the 2002 New Year's Day address, *taiwan* invariably appears more often than *ROC*. Usually *ROC* is seen only in three standard, designated places: at the beginning of speeches marking the ROC calendar; at points where Chen mentions being president of ROC; and at the end when he wishes great prosperity for the country. This pattern is particularly consistent in speeches following the 2001 National Day address. However, *taiwan* steadily increases and appears up to as many as 94 times in a single speech in 2007, serving variously as political slogan, catchword, and motto for political rallies.

A closer look reveals that the larger number of references to *taiwan* in Chen's 2000 victory and inaugural speeches changes to fewer uses between 2000 and 2002, but that the former pattern resumes and even increases – to about twice as many – beginning with the 2002 National Day Rally speech. As the first native-born Taiwanese president, Chen was eager to promote the 'Taiwan spirit' in his first victory and inaugural speeches. The reality of being a minority president, and having to attempt to construct a common identity under the combined pressure of the KMT, China, and the United States, soon tamed Chen's eagerness to capitalise on 'Taiwanese-ness'.

After two years in office, it appeared that the divided voting population was increasingly less likely to unite and there was also no lessening of China's threat. Under such circumstances, gradually promoting *taiwan* seemed to be an effective rhetorical strategy, particularly since Chen had to prepare for a second-term re-election whose success depended mainly on supporters advocating Taiwan's independent identity. Chen was again ready to use *taiwan* over *ROC*, reaching a peak of 36 times in the 2004 New Year's speech just before his re-election. That Chen won a second term further granted him more freedom to promote the name *taiwan*, except in 2005 when he tried to cooperate with People's First Party and in 2006 when Red Shirt Army tried to oust Chen. By the same token, *ROC* continues to dwindle even as he prepares for his re-election – while more respect was extended to *ROC* during Chen's first term, this was not the case during his second term. For Chen,

Table 1. Frequency of words *taiwan* and *ROC* in presidential addresses, 2000–2008.

| Occasion of the speech | Date | <i>taiwan</i> | <i>ROC</i> | Total |
|--|------------------|---------------|------------|-------|
| Victory Speech after the 10th Republic of China Presidential and Vice Presidential Election | 18 March 2000 | 22 | 1 | 23 |
| Inaugural Speech | 20 May 2000 | 41 | 9 | 50 |
| Address to the 2000 National Day | 10 October 2000 | 8 | 7 | 13 |
| Address to the 2000 National Day Rally | 10 October 2000 | 11 | 5 | 16 |
| Millennium Talk | 31 December 2000 | 20 | 4 | 24 |
| New Year's Day Address | 1 January 2001 | 13 | 9 | 20 |
| Address to the 2001 National Day | 10 October 2001 | 12 | 3 | 14 |
| Address to the 2001 National Day Rally | 10 October 2001 | 14 | 2 | 16 |
| New Year's Day Address | 1 January 2002 | 1 | 3 | 4 |
| Address to the 2002 National Day | 10 October 2002 | 9 | 3 | 12 |
| Address to the 2002 National Day Rally | 10 October 2002 | 28 | 3 | 31 |
| New Year's Day Address | 1 January 2003 | 20 | 3 | 23 |
| Address to the 2003 National Day | 10 October 2003 | 29 | 3 | 32 |
| Address to the 2003 National Day Rally | 10 October 2003 | 24 | 4 | 28 |
| New Year's Day Address | 1 January 2004 | 36 | 4 | 40 |
| Inaugural Speech | 20 May 2004 | 48 | 8 | 56 |
| Address to the 2004 National Day | 10 October 2004 | 26 | 2 | 28 |
| Address to the 2004 National Day Rally | 10 October 2004 | 50 | 7 | 57 |
| New Year's Day Address | 1 January 2005 | 29 | 3 | 32 |
| Address to the 2005 National Day | 10 October 2005 | 24 | 2 | 26 |
| Address to the 2005 National Day Rally | 10 October 2005 | 32 | 1 | 32 |
| New Year's Day Address | 1 January 2006 | 64 | 2 | 66 |
| Address to the 2006 National Day | 10 October 2006 | 57 | 2 | 59 |
| Address to the 2006 National Day Rally | 10 October 2006 | 19 | 1 | 20 |
| New Year's Day Address | 1 January 2007 | 53 | 1 | 54 |
| Address to the 2007 National Day | 10 October 2007 | 94 | 1 | 95 |
| New Year's Day Address | 1 January 2008 | 68 | 1 | 73 |

promoting *taiwan* has always been an effective rhetorical strategy, except when the situation made its use politically unfeasible.

In promoting a localised Taiwanese identity, Chen not only uses *taiwan* consistently in most of his national addresses, but constructs a 'story of Taiwan' (cf. West, 2002). Such discourse, however, must also be acceptable to audiences endorsing *ROC*, distant though the link may be. In the following, we look more closely at discourse strategies of *taiwan* and *ROC* in speeches on three types of occasions: (1) inaugurations and election victories; (2) National Day celebrations; and (3) New Year's Day celebrations. Each type of discourse is formulated in Taiwan's idiosyncratic political contexts and must attend to unique meanings; moreover, within each type we will be able to trace the chronological evolution of Taiwan's politics.

Victory and inaugural speeches

Consistent with the observations of earlier commentators (McDiarmid, 1937), Chen's use of the two names in his victory and inaugural speeches is uniform, with

taiwan far outnumbering *ROC*. Chen's first victory resulted from an election in which rule of Taiwan transferred from KMT (from outside Taiwan) to the DPP (local to Taiwan). It was the second direct presidential election and had the highest voting rate (82.69%) in Taiwan's history. Chen won the election with 39% of the vote in the face of China's warnings about independence. This historical moment is popularly described as 'changing sky' (*bian tian*), causing the previously 'accredited' text (Sauer, 1997) endorsing China-centredness to minimise its reference power, and to be replaced by the new symbol *taiwan*.

Despite unexpectedly winning the election due to a split between two KMT candidates, as Taiwan's first 'native son' president, Chen felt justified celebrating rising Taiwanese consciousness (*taiwan yishi*, exemplified by the promotion of indigenous culture and languages and sociopolitical changes in recent years [B-y. Chang, 2004; Chao, 2003]) by mentioning *taiwan* 22 times and *ROC* only once, at the beginning: 'The election results for the 10th ROC Presidential and Vice Presidential election have been declared'. However, even this brief reference is immediately modified by the next phrase, 'Taiwan's second democratic presidential election' (Chen, 2000a).

This and other speeches officially ratify rising Taiwanese consciousness, which no longer had to hide underground: 'Taiwan has written a new chapter in our road to democracy ...' and indeed, 'This moment is a dignified and sacred one in the history of Taiwan – because the courageous people of Taiwan, with love and hope, have conquered fear and darkness'. In this speech, 'Taiwanese people' is the concept most frequently invoked (eight times, with two additional references to the people, without 'Taiwanese'). Taiwanese people are, for example, encouraged to '... use their noblest souls ... to ratify the advancement of our country and society successfully'. Chen's appreciation goes to 'the people of Taiwan', and his election is 'a victory for democracy and a victory for the people'. His responsibilities are to fulfill a 'mission mandated by the people and by history to serve Taiwan's 23 million citizens'. Near the speech's end, the president's wish, 'Long live the people of Taiwan!', is particularly noteworthy, since it appropriates and replaces an earlier popular KMT slogan, 'Long Live President Chiang! Long live the Republic of China!'

This 'common identity' is construed as uniquely Taiwanese, as it belong to people in the territory of Taiwan and several offshore islands, not including people on the mainland, as stipulated by the Constitution of the Republic of China. On the other hand, defining people by territory rather than the commonly used ethnic labels of 'Taiwanese' or 'Chinese' frequently employed in Taiwan's election campaigns (Horowitz & Tan, 2005), also allows 'Taiwanese people' to be 'Chinese,' and helps consolidate the feeling of the land, to become a nation. The rhetorical strategy of appealing to 'the people' as a generic category helps erase boundaries between those with differing views about Taiwan's national identity.

In the midst of opponents accusing him of practicing *mincui*, or utilising people and arousing their emotions to accomplish political goals, such strategies may be necessary given Chen's status as a minority president. This constant appeal to the people recalls the observation that the 'rhetorical presidency' is an effective means of seeking popular support while bypassing the legislature (Ceaser et al., 1982). Whether it is those elated by Chen's victory, or those who regret the passing of Chinese authenticity as the bond between Taiwan and China continues to unravel

(Cook, 2005), such an all-inclusive label seems to put them in the same category and implies what Sauer (1997) describes as formal, non-personally involved indeterminateness to speak for all citizens.

While the victory speech is only a prelude to this historical moment, the much anticipated inaugural speech was closely scrutinised by China and the United States. Worrying that Chen would promote Taiwan's independence, prior to the delivery of the speech, China warned Chen that he must adopt its 'One China' policy. In addition, China also held many conferences prior to his inauguration to advocate the 'One China' policy and deployed hundreds of ballistic missiles on its southeast coast targeting Taiwan. Sandwiched between China's pressure and Taiwan's divided national identity, rumor has it that Chen's speech was composed in collaboration with the United States, an assertion the United States has denied.

Chen's 2000 inaugural speech (Chen, 2000b) is titled, 'Taiwan Stands Up: Toward the Dawn of a Rising Era', a speech that many considered satisfactory to all concerned participants (except perhaps pro-independence supporters) as it extended a friendly gesture toward China. The 'One China' policy, though not accepted, was rendered as a problem to be discussed in the future, and most significantly, Chen pledged support for the four plus one no's (*si bu yi meiyou*, 四不一沒有) during his term as president:

... as long as the CCP regime has no intention to use military force against Taiwan, I pledge that during my term in office, I will not declare independence, I will not change the national title, I will not push forth the inclusion of the so-called 'state-to-state' description in the Constitution, and I will not promote a referendum to change the status quo in regards to the question of independence or unification. Furthermore, the abolition of the National Reunification Council or the National Reunification Guidelines will not be an issue.

(Chen, 2000b)

Chen's pledge is as much a response to China as it is to pan-blue supporters who endorse the *ROC* symbol – not to change the national title, engage in Constitutional reform, declare Taiwan's independence, leave the National Reunification Guidelines⁷ intact, and so on, amount to supporting Taiwan's official title, the Republic of China and its Constitution. Since the Constitution still endorses the 'One China' policy, the newly elected president must abide by it to gain legitimacy, and abiding by it implies acceptance of the policy. Unlike the victory speech which virtually ignores *ROC*, in the inaugural speech *ROC* must also have its rightful place (see Hong, 2005).

Not to refuse the PRC's China also implies acceptance of the ROC's China, a complicated, murky problem that may be described as encompassing five Chinas. The first is the cultural and historical China; the second is the China from 1912 to 1949, created by the KMT on the Chinese mainland and also birthplace to the CCP; the third and fourth Chinas, from 1949, when China spit into two, creating the ROC's China and the PRC's China; and finally, the question of whether PRC and ROC will become a unified, fifth China⁸ (*United Newspaper Editorial*, 7 May, 2000).

Chen's conception of the three nations – China, ROC, and Taiwan – were challenged in response to the call for 'One China' (cf. *United News Editorial*, 7 May 2000). Under such contexts, the president must address different audiences to foster an impression of completeness and invoke feelings of solidarity (Sauer, 1997). *ROC* appears nine times in the 2000 inaugural speech, and at a more subdued level of

emotionality. As should become clear, such forms of positioning of *ROC* comprise the minority, occurring only in inaugural speeches, the 2004 National Day Rally speech, and speeches prior to New Year's Day Address in 2001.

Chen's seeming compromise is subtly but skillfully remedied by his rhetoric employing *taiwan*. Despite a frame that presumably includes China, *taiwan* continues to be the central, key symbol, appearing 41 times, as in, 'Taiwan stands up, demonstrating a firmness of purpose and faith in democracy'. As an abstract entity, *taiwan* actively creates its own destiny and fulfils its dreams. Through such phrases, Chen hopes to induce collaborative expectancy and complicity with his audience, since '... a speaker does not chance on the words that "trigger"; rather he chooses them deliberately to unite the knowledge and experience of his audience' (Paine, 1981, p. 12).

Taiwan and Taiwanese people also share a more intimate, blood connection: *taiwan* – more than *ROC* – is mother to all its inhabitants: '... each citizen of Formosa is a "child of Taiwan" just like me ...'; 'In whatever difficult environment, Taiwan will be like a selfless, loving mother'; and 'All grace and glory belongs to Taiwan – our eternal Mother'. Focusing on the metaphorical implications of maternal nurturing and love, Chen instills in *taiwan* the qualities of warmth, loving care, and firmness. The image of Taiwan as 'mother' has been used by DPP and TSU supporters in songs, articles, and so on; recalling the Taiwanese dialect song, 'Our Mother is Called Taiwan' (*muqin de ming jiao Taiwan*,⁹ 母親的名叫台灣) which calls on people to 'Bravely mention your mother's name. Taiwan! Taiwan! You are the name of Mother'.¹⁰ As Ruddick (1995) notes, a mother is committed to meet the demands of preservation, growth, and social acceptability of a child. While 'mother' can be soft and tender, when there is danger to the child, the mother can become militant and aggressive. Mother Taiwan is thus a symbol of fierce defensiveness along with gentle support (cf. Hayden, 2003).

Moreover, whereas expressions using *taiwan* are energetic, spirited, active, and passionate, those with *ROC* are often connected to historical facts, the tone official and somewhat detached. For example, the historic alternation of political parties in 2000 is the '... first of its kind in the history of the Republic of China', and 'We believe that the Republic of China ... can certainly continue to play an indispensable role in the international community'. Further, whatever glory *ROC* enjoys it must owe to *taiwan*: '... the Taiwanese people have toiled hard to ... lay the foundation for the survival and development of the Republic of China'. Through such rhetoric, Chen becomes the medium through which his audience interprets *ROC* as *taiwan* experience (cf. Paine, 1981).

The 2004 inaugural speech (Chen, 2004b), 'Paving the Way for a Sustainable Taiwan', echoes the passion that infuses the 2000 speech. Following a similar pattern, *taiwan* appears 48 times, *ROC*, only eight. Ironically, while identification with *taiwan* continues to rise, identification with Chen and the DPP encountered serious challenges, since on 19 March 2004, one day before the presidential election, a gunman shot and wounded incumbents President Chen and Vice President Lu with two bullets. Chen later won election by a very narrow margin, prompting opponents' claims that the gunshots were staged to arouse people's sympathy. Opponents also demanded a recount of the votes and filed lawsuits to nullify the election itself and the election results. On 17 June 2005, the Supreme Court rejected the appeal to

nullify the election results and on 16 September 2005, the appeal to nullify the election itself was also dismissed.¹¹

Derogated by some as the ‘two bullet president’ and with his inaugural speech delivered along with protesting black balloons inscribed, ‘No Truth, No President’, Chen’s 2004 speech was toned down and attempted to instill a spirit of tolerance and cooperation among people. On top of internal challenges was a repetition of China’s carrot-and-stick warning, just three days before the speech, that Chen has only two choices: drop his drive for Taiwan’s independence and gain economic and diplomatic benefits, or keep his separatist agenda and meet his own destruction (China warns Taiwan to drop independence move, *New York Times*, 17 May 2004).

The standoff between China and Taiwan was again mediated by the United States, with Chen’s inaugural speech contents reviewed in advance by the United States in consultation with Beijing, in order to avoid any further provocative language (Kahn & Buck, 2004). Here again we see the seemingly puzzling connection between China’s intervention and Chen’s having to support the *ROC*. By not promoting *taiwan*, it seemed natural to fall back to the *ROC*. In addition, use of *ROC* helps uphold Taiwan’s connection to China, despite the fact that it is a China that was not recognised by the PRC and many other nations in the world.

Despite being forced to abandon the stronger pro-independence pledges he made during the campaign by avoiding radical constitutional reform and also leaving open the possibility of reunification by reiterating pledges made in his 2000 inaugural speech, in this speech, Chen’s strategy of focusing on *taiwan* as the center and *ROC* as peripheral remains consistent with his new rhetorical strategies. Other than at the beginning, where Chen calls himself the eleventh *ROC* president, and at the end, where he says, ‘... let us wish the Republic of China great prosperity’, in the remaining six instances, interestingly, *ROC* never appears by itself without *taiwan*. In this speech *ROC* no longer is presented as sole agent of Taiwan’s identity.

This new rhetorical strategy juxtaposing *ROC* and *taiwan* is implemented to continue, albeit implicitly, the ‘one country on each side’ stance (Comments on the Substance, 2004). This is done, first, by putting them on equal footing, where either can represent the other. In calling for a united Taiwan, Chen states: ‘... whether an individual identifies with Taiwan or with the Republic of China, *per se*, a common destiny has bequeathed upon all of us the same parity and dignity’. In another revealing example, Chen states, ‘... in the future, the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China – or Taiwan and China – can seek to establish relations in any form whatsoever’. Note how *taiwan* is used to designate *ROC* whereas *China* is reserved for the *PRC*. Similarly, ‘Let Taiwan, the Republic of China, work toward solidarity and harmony, fairness and justice, prosperity and equality’.

This use of the paired symbols marks *taiwan* and *ROC* as appropriate, equivalent, and interchangeable designators, echoing Chen’s earlier claim that ‘Taiwan *is* *ROC* and *ROC is* Taiwan’. This implicit yet consistent attempt to rectify Taiwan’s name from *ROC* to *taiwan* can also be observed in the addition of *taiwan* under *ROC* on the covers of *ROC* passports, beginning in September 2004, as well as adding ‘(Taiwan)’ next to the official presidential website’s title, ‘Republic of China’ in August 2005.

A second tactic positions *taiwan* as the force that gives substance to *ROC*. The essence of *ROC*, as suggested in the 2000 inaugural speech, has to be realised by Taiwan, its people and their accomplishments. Chen boldly proclaimed: ‘A half

century of toil and labor by the people of this land has culminated in what is now known as the “Taiwan Experience”, the fruits of which validate the existence of the Republic of China’. Even as Chen acknowledges his position as ROC president, the persistent symbol *taiwan* is involved: ‘As the President of the Republic of China, I have been mandated by the people of Taiwan to defend the sovereignty, security and dignity of this nation . . .’ *Taiwan* is the force infusing *ROC*, wherever it is manifest: ‘The Republic of China now exists in Taiwan, Penghu (The Pescadores), Kinmen and Matsu’.

Throughout, *taiwan* remains the guiding symbol. It is one of those ‘banner words’ whose forceful impact lies in the fact that they may ‘. . . contain no proposition but are such that they are likely to induce a proposition by inference’ (Paine, 1981, p. 14). *ROC* may stand on equal footing with or be subordinated to *taiwan*, but it can no longer subsume *taiwan*. If not for contentious voices in Taiwanese culture and politics, together with Chen’s role as president, it is possible he might have abandoned Taiwan’s official title, ‘Republic of China’.¹²

On the other hand, having lost the presidential election a second time, KMT and PFP leaders have begun to cooperate with China to prevent Taiwan’s independence. KMT chairperson Lien Chan’s visit to China in April 2005 (followed by PFP head James Soong’s visit) boasted of the fact that it was the first time a KMT leader had ever come into contact with Chinese Communists after Chiang lost the Chinese civil war in 1949. Framed as ‘a journey for peace’, China received Lien as if he were a head of the state, and symbolically marginalised President Chen’s position. These acts have been seen by many as endorsing a pro-China stance, which has intensified tension and further fortified the distinction between *taiwan* and *ROC*, particularly since it took place right after China has implemented its ‘anti-secession law’ in March, 2005, which lays a legal basis for using non-peaceful means against Taiwan should it declare independence.

The evolution of this process under constant scrutiny by spectators such as China and the United States may explain why, in May 2005, Chen opted not to give a speech on the first anniversary of his second term as president. Chen was likely thinking the speech would have had to address such contentious issues as cross-strait policy, especially in light of the visits by Lien and Soong (T.-I. Huang, 2005). Chen’s speech would have had to mediate the gap between his party’s predominantly anti-China stance and the pro-China position held by Lien and Soong and would likely have offended all parties. Thus, what ordinarily would have provoked little more than a yawn from Taiwan’s citizens could have stimulated a domestic crisis. It was another rhetorical exigency probably best handled by *not* giving a speech.

Despite various obstacles, Chen’s goal of effectively driving *ROC* out of Taiwan’s national identity discourse and replacing it with *taiwan* continues, if not materially then symbolically. As *ROC* is seen drawing closer to the People’s Republic of China, the symbol *taiwan* must gain further currency to stand against *ROC*, so as to prevent Taiwan from being taken over by the PRC. This is clearly shown in Chen’s continuing attempt to promote Taiwan for membership in the United Nations under the name *taiwan*, not *ROC*. Rising Taiwanese consciousness and identification with Taiwan has certainly helped to fortify this claim, and the lifting of pressure to run for the office of president again has lessened Chen’s burden of having to please multiple stakeholders. Externally, the upcoming Olympic games in Beijing also have somewhat forced China to be less aggressive toward Taiwan. Although in Taiwan there

may still be around 50% of the people who would like to endorse *Taiwan* to help DPP candidate Hsieh to win the 2008 presidential election (even though Hsieh was beaten by KMT candidate Ma Ying-Jeou in the election), Taiwanese nationalism (Horowitz & Tan, 2005) and its symbol *taiwan* must continue to be vigorously promoted.

National Day and National Day rally speeches

National Day speeches are a unique variant of presidential speeches. 10 October 1911 was the date of Wuchang uprising which eventually led to *Qing* dynasty's fall and the establishment of the ROC. It is the nation's *birthday*, and its importance is often accompanied by the waving of national flags – the 'blue sky, white sun, and red of all lands' – singing the national anthem and fireworks. The 'national meaning' (Ensink, 1997) of the Double Tenth commemorative, then is officially that Taiwan, having been 'rescued' by the KMT, returned to the bosom of the motherland, the ROC. In the midst of such political implications, however, is the uplifting spirit of the occasion, with various groups joining rallies and performing in a parade outside the Presidential Hall, symbolizing the country's prosperity. Especially after Chen assumed the presidency, aside from rituals performed in front of the Presidential Hall, there were also celebrations sponsored by various city and county governments, rendering the occasion less serious and more carnival-like, forms of enjoyment presumed to unite all people.

The Double Tenth celebration requires the president to give two official speeches: the National Day speech delivered to government officials, and the National Day rally speech delivered to the parade performers and other invited guests. Through the ceremony this meaning system is enacted and sustained, and serves to establish points with which Chen's speeches must align – and negotiate – with the accepted official ideology. Chen, a DPP member, was erecting huge pictures of Taiwan as decorations to emphasise *taiwan*; at the same time, historical constraints on the importance of the *ROC* as established by the long ruling KMT's nationalist government and reinforced by Chen's role as the nation's representative, compelled him to integrate Taiwanese and Chinese consciousness, even if temporarily and rhetorically. As Taiwan consciousness continues to rise and the symbol *ROC* increasingly becomes split between pan-green supporters' dismissal and pan-blue supporters' strong endorsement, every year the National Day speeches present a rhetorical exigency that Chen must successfully handle to appease not only his divided people but also international powers.

Chen's advocacy for *taiwan* can be clearly observed in his mention of the term in National Day speeches eight times in his first year, with the years following the 2002 National Day Rally speech seeing *taiwan* used more often, to a whopping 94 times in his last year as ROC president. As for *ROC*, the president began by mentioning it more frequently in 2000 and reduced that frequency to three of four times each speech in subsequent years. The 2004 National Day Rally speech appears to be an anomaly, with *ROC* increasing to seven times, but as should become clear, this frequency is actually used to show *taiwan* and *ROC* standing on an equal footing, as in the 2004 Inaugural Speech (see above). After 2004, Chen barely mentions *ROC*, only one or two times, to a dramatic ending in the 2007 National Day speech, mentioning *ROC* only once – not at the beginning or end, but in the text commenting on how inappropriate *ROC* is as a name for Taiwan's claim for UN membership.

In earlier years, Chen mentions *taiwan* relatively infrequently, departing from his pattern in other national addresses. This tendency aligns with the purpose of National Day, to celebrate establishing the Republic of China, *not* the Republic of Taiwan. His focus on *ROC* was also compelled by challenges his ruling party must face, including the political stalemate due to the KMT-dominated legislature which boycotts many governmental actions; the impasse triggered by China's distrust of Chen's pro-independence position and its continuous threat to Taiwan; and a worldwide economic recession (Wu, 2001). 2002 fared no better; as Rigger (2003) called it, 'Another year of political droughts and typhoons' (p. 41).

For a newly sworn ROC president, it was natural for Chen to heed his representative function by respecting the status of the country (officially ROC) at that time, particularly recalling the 'five no's' pledge Chen made in his 2000 inaugural speech just five months previously. In the 2000 National Day speech (Chen, 2000c), as a departure from his 2000 inaugural speech, although *taiwan* still appears more frequently than *ROC*, aside from conventionally designated places, *ROC* is also mentioned in several contexts suggesting compassion and respect:

... during its 89-year history the ROC has experienced an initial period of trials and tribulations, received assistance from foreign nations and become self-reliant, undergone colonial and authoritarian rule, and won worldwide acclamation with an economic miracle. Finally, before the end of the century, [it]¹³ has accomplished a democratic alternation of political parties in power, a 'political miracle' that gives impetus to our entry into the new century.

Although this passage appears only after various statements about *taiwan*, a personified *ROC* is shown accomplishing specific actions. Continuing to endorse the Taiwan spirit and the role played by Taiwanese people or compatriots, Chen expresses passion for *ROC*. Not merely a formal designator, *ROC* is firm in its struggles, even though its energy must be instilled by the government: 'Despite internal worries and foreign threats, the ROC has survived the difficulties, remaining firm on its feet and striding forward'; and, 'On the threshold of a new era, our new government, based on the solid foundation that has been laid, commits itself to a series of reforms, which will instill uplifting energy into the ROC'.

These statements seem to replicate depictions of *taiwan* in Chen's other inaugural speeches. Passion, hope, and inspiration are no longer associated only with *taiwan*, but are equally qualities of *ROC*. This is consistent with Ragsdale's (1987, pp. 704–705) observation that 'Presidents define their public audience as a unified people with a genuinely consensual public opinion and a commonly agreed upon public interest'. Since Chen cannot appease all, or perhaps indeed even any, of the parties involved, his speeches are actually 'cloaked in terms of national agreement, [and yet they] convey messages on issues of political dispute ...' (p. 706). This reallocation of symbolic resources responds to differential expectations of alternate contexts. While the inauguration speech reconfirms the centrality of *taiwan*, the National Day speech shows delight in the establishment of *ROC*, or at least *ROC* 'in progress'.

Similar statements appear in the 2000 National Day Rally speech (Chen, 2000d): 'During the almost one hundred years of the history of the Republic of China ... none of the achievements it made came about without our having to overcome many obstacles and difficulties'. Moreover, 'Yet the role of the Republic of China in the twenty-first century should not only be that of 'the realiser of democracy', but also

that of ‘a protector of peace in the Asia Pacific’ and ‘an active participant in the international community’. Interestingly, these positive comments about *ROC*, seemingly made as if only to please pan-blue supporters in the first year of Chen’s term, no longer appear in later National Day speeches.

While catering to conventional expectations concerning *ROC*’s birthday, Chen does not neglect the ‘Taiwan Spirit’, a key phrase mentioned five times:

The Taiwan Spirit originates from the interaction and mutual influence of Han culture and Austronesian islands cultures. It was successfully forged through all of our hardships and dreams. From the shores of the Pacific Ocean to the top of Mount Jade, all the people living on this land spare no effort, wisdom, confidence and hope in order to see the best understanding of this Taiwan Spirit recorded.

(Chen, 2000d)

Taiwan’s people are not just Han Chinese, but a mixture of this and aboriginal island cultures. Also infusing Taiwan’s history and adding geographical markers as bases on which to anchor the Taiwan spirit, *taiwan* is now a total and complete symbol with associated people, territory, and identification, key elements for a nation. As Taiwan is further removed from the Sinic world (B.-y. Chang, 2004), even though *ROC* remains valid, it can and must embrace the ‘Taiwan spirit’. While endorsing the National Day’s official meaning system, Chen revises it to redefine the audience experience of Taiwan-centredness, or at least, Chen endeavors to own *ROC*, rather than being possessed by *ROC*.

A similar pattern holds for the 2001 National Day and National Day Rally speeches (Chen, 2001b,c) and the 2002 National Day speech (Chen, 2002b). While those speeches assume more a ‘matter of fact’ tone, outlining obstacles and problems, proposing solutions, containing less sentimental commentary or overtly optimistic rhetoric, they still advocate the centrality of *taiwan*. The 2001 National Day speech elaborates Taiwan’s accomplishments and the role it intends to develop on the international stage, while sparing one sentence describing how *ROC* survived hardships and obstacles. The 2001 National Day Rally speech proudly reiterates *taiwan* as mother to its people, and the 2002 National Day speech outlines Taiwan’s accomplishments and future directions. Despite minor variations, all three speeches mention *ROC* very infrequently; in fact, from this point forward, the master narrative *ROC* has been minimised and even has become nearly extinct since 2005.

In speeches for the 2002 National Day Rally (Chen, 2002c) and the 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007 National Day and National Day Rallies (Chen, 2003b,c, 2004c,d, 2005b,c, 2006b,c, 2007b), *taiwan* is not only associated with energy, enthusiasm, and high spirits but the frequency with which it is mentioned increases significantly. Even when celebrating the establishment of *ROC*, heavily promoting *taiwan* appears to be a savvy political strategy, particularly since Chen assumed the DPP chairmanship in July 2002 and was to run for election in 2004. Moreover, his earlier, more conciliatory posture toward KMT and its supporters seemed not to have had the anticipated effect with the public continuing to divide, leading to his more hardened position. His strong rhetoric for *taiwan*, if not persuading pan-blue supporters, reconfirms the pan-green’s understanding of Taiwan’s identity:

This is the ‘Taiwan Spirit’, it is the backbone of Taiwan’s enduring energetic vitality and competitiveness. Even in the worst environment, no one should ever underestimate Taiwan’s potential, and we should never lose faith in our own will and courage.

(Chen, 2002c)

While *ROC* continues to appear in the usual places, *taiwan* is mentioned more than twice as often, compared to earlier National Day speeches. The same pattern held while he was preparing for re-election. We also find phrases such as ‘faith in democracy, faith in reform, faith in Taiwan’ (Chen, 2003c). Most importantly, the story of Taiwan is one of persistence and success:

Although Taiwan is a small island, we must aspire to reach high goals. Despite meeting with relentless and unjustifiable suppression in the international stage, our efforts and strengths have finally enabled us to pass the test of competition and capture these medals that belong to all of us.

(Chen, 2004c)

It is in the 2004 National Day Rally speech (Chen, 2004d) that Taiwan-centredness reaches a peak, in line with Chen’s second-term victory. The frequent reference to *taiwan* – 50 times – provides a summary and expansion of the range of meanings associated with being Taiwanese: Taiwanese people, spirit, experience, identity, story, history, and so on. Identification as ‘Taiwanese only’, for example, moves from 36.9% just after Chen had assumed presidency in 2000, to 43.7% at the end of 2004; identification as ‘both Taiwanese and Chinese’ maintains a position around 45%; and identification as ‘Chinese only’ is much lower, at about 5% (Election Study Center, N.C.C.U., 2007).

The increased frequency in use of *ROC*, however, must be understood from its positioning, where clever alteration and molding of meanings of the two symbols is enacted. Much as in the 2004 inaugural speech, additional occurrences of *ROC* in the 2004 National Day Rally speech seem less for the purpose of advocating the centrality of the *ROC* and more to supplement, and even legitimize, the meaning of *taiwan*: ‘The sovereignty of the Republic of China is vested with the 23 million people of Taiwan. The Republic of China is Taiwan, and Taiwan is the Republic of China. This is an indisputable fact’. Elsewhere, Chen states, ‘If both sides are willing, on the basis of goodwill, to create an environment based upon “peaceful development and freedom of choice”, then in the future, the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China – or Taiwan and China – can seek to establish political relations in any form whatsoever’. References to *ROC* in this speech do not foreground sentimental feelings about ‘Chinese-ness’, but provide additional occasions for asserting the central nature of *taiwan*.

Apart from a few anomalies to accommodate particular situations, in all National Day speeches, Chen elevates *taiwan* by referring to it frequently, and in an active and engaging voice. However, because the Double Tenth spirit may not entirely resonate with the ‘Taiwan story’, the president painstakingly positions *ROC* by acknowledging it with due respect, but reformulating it to encompass emergent nativistic Taiwanese sentiments.

Despite such constraints, Chen is persistent in elevating *taiwan* and gradually driving *ROC* out of official discourse, even on *ROC*’s National Day. In the 2005 and 2006 National Day speeches, Chen (2006b) mentions *taiwan* a total of 24 and 57 times, respectively, and *ROC* only twice, at the beginning and at the end. In National

Day Rally speeches, *taiwan* appears 32 times in 2005 and 19 times in 2006, with *ROC* appearing only once, at the beginning: ‘today is ROC’s 94th (and 95th) birthday.’

The appearance of *taiwan* only 19 times in the 2006 National Day Rally speech represents its lowest frequency since 2002, an anomaly given the presence of the ‘red shirts army’ protesting outside, accusing Chen and his family of corruption and calling for his ouster. Directed specifically toward President Chen, the 2006 National Day rally was one of most chaotic events in the history of the celebration with even attending parliamentary members wearing red shirts to disrupt the ceremony, leading to DPP’s calling for the ceremony and speech to be cancelled. Earlier corruption charges have also enabled KMT to gain victories in the 2005 local executive elections. Despite such difficult times, Chen remained committed to downgrading and marginalizing *ROC*, as the two camps’ positions toward each other seemed to have grown stronger and resistant to change.

In the 2007 celebration – the last ceremony for Chen in his tenure as president – Chen obviously refuses to name *ROC* (*United News Editorial*, 2007). He delivered only a National Day speech (Chen, 2007b), but not a National Day Rally speech, the first time an ROC president has refrained from delivering a speech to the public, thus fundamentally altering the official meaning of the National day. He also did not attend the ceremony, some speculating that this was so that he could avoid singing the national anthem and bowing to the ROC national flag. Also, in line with DPP’s efforts to promote Taiwan’s entry into the United Nations under the name *taiwan*, Chen replaced a banner that had to that time proclaimed ‘Celebrating *ROC*’s National Day’, with one that read ‘holding hands to help *Taiwan* enter the UN’ (Bien Replaced ROC with Taiwan, 2007). Under KMT’s protest, Chen eventually agreed to have the four characters, *zhonghuaminguo* (*ROC*) and its national flag reappear on the site in the presidential hall. Many pan-blue supporters were forced to have their own celebrations in various cities and counties ruled by pan-blue governors to show their respect to the Republic of China – its flag and national anthem.

In this National Day speech, Chen mentions *taiwan* a total of 94 times, mentioning *ROC* only once, when he discusses how inappropriate it would be if the name *ROC* were used for Taiwan to return to the United Nations! Most noteworthy, instead of beginning the speech with, ‘Today is the 96th birthday of the Republic of China’ similar to what he had done previously, he said instead, ‘Today is the Double Tenth Celebration of 2007’, ending the speech with ‘Happy Double Tenth National Day, may Taiwan be peaceful and prosperous ... Long live democracy, and go, Taiwan!’ (Chen, 2007b). That phrase, ‘Happy Double Tenth National Day’, officially ends the longstanding routine slogan, ‘Prosperity to the Republic of China’, a phrase that was always chanted at many official speeches in the history of the ROC, including Chen’s previous National Day speeches. Chen’s effort is echoed by Joseph Wu, Taiwan’s chief representative to the United States, who refrained from mentioning ROC but named ‘Taiwan’s National Day’ in a speech delivered to Double Tenth celebration held in Washington, DC, on 10 October 2007. Is *taiwan* still the *ROC* or are they simply incompatible? Chen’s National Day speeches apparently try to redefine what Taiwan is, even though its people are still far from any consensus.

New Year's Day speeches

A third type of speech seems somewhat softer, in that it does not involve official occasions associated with 'historical responsibility'. Some such speeches are delivered on New Year's Day, one on the occasion of the millennium. These addresses mark the transition of time and hence tend to concentrate on a more forward-looking perspective.

Similar to others and in line with patterns established around the 2001 National Day speech, these speeches mention *taiwan* far more frequently and extensively than *ROC*, except for the 2002 speech (Chen, 2002a), where *taiwan* is mentioned only once and *ROC* three times. *Taiwan* increasingly comes to refer to the people and the island country, occurring principally in utterances noteworthy for passion and personification, doubling to 64 times in the 2006 speech, and reaching a peak of 68 times in the 2008 speech. The name *ROC*, after the 2001 speech which gives it some recognition, appears an average of only three to four times each speech, designating highly specific circumstances, usually related to an official view. By 2006, it was mentioned only twice and in the New Year's Day speech of 2007 and 2008, only once.

In the millennium speech (Chen, 2000e), *ROC* is mentioned only four times, in customary phrases such as, 'Tomorrow is also the 90th anniversary of the founding of the Republic of China'; in addition, in responding to China's influence Chen discussed the 'One China' Policy in *ROC* Constitution and also mentioned that '... we would like to appeal to the government and leaders on the Chinese mainland to respect the existence and international dignity of the Republic of China'. Although China's threat was eminent, *ROC* remains tinged with the flavor of *taiwan*, as in, 'The Republic of China has successively made hard-earned economic achievements, courageously "fought big with small", and created a world-acclaimed miracle on Taiwan'.

Taiwan, on the other hand, appears 20 times, imbued with passion and emotion. *Taiwan* and *Taiwanese people* seem parallel – at times *taiwan* is a political entity actively creating its own destiny while at others it is the people who make *taiwan* possible:

During the past century, Taiwan has experienced a variety of struggles: from resisting colonial rule, to maintaining a bastion of anti-communism, to developing a democratic movement under an authoritarian system.

We can say the twentieth century has especially favored Taiwan, as it has given the people of this land a chance to challenge and better themselves. Taiwan is like a 'rose that will never be squashed', in the words of the senior Taiwan writer Yang Kuei ... Over the course of an entire century, the people of Taiwan established the best definition of the 'Taiwan spirit'.

(Chen, 2000e)

Here the 'Taiwan spirit' is given more complete treatment, reasserting Taiwan's collective memory (see West, 2002); until very recently, Taiwan's history before 1949 was hardly mentioned in its educational system, because the China-centered orientation focused on the *ROC* on the mainland prior to 1949. That 2000 marks a new 'native rule' in Taiwan is further emphasised by the symbolic implication of the new millennium – a moment in history said to compel renewal of the 'Taiwan spirit' through rethinking the past and venturing into the future. Hence, despite its seeming stylistic inappropriateness – that is, it does not follow the rules of brevity,

easily chanted phrases, and so on, for media consumption (Sauer, 1997) – the incorporation of a more involved historical account must be seen as achieving a higher end.

Reflecting the hope of the new millennium, toward the end, Chen describes a black-and-white picture of an aboriginal baseball batter of the Red Leaf Little League Team concentrating on the next pitch, while at his side his teammates hold their breath to encourage him. ‘Such a beautiful moment’, Chen says, ‘perfectly captures twentieth century Taiwan and is a memory that I will never forget’. This image becomes national memory and the past is invoked to serve present aims (West, 2002), i.e., ‘giving [the] past a future’ (p. 216). Glorious past and hopeful future are conflated to rhetorically construct an image uniting all people in Taiwan (cf. Branham, 1999).

To provide balance and in an effort to include all in Taiwan, the 2001 New Year’s Day speech (Chen, 2001a) shows an almost equal distribution: thirteen occurrences of *taiwan*, nine for *ROC*, with the passion for *taiwan* somewhat waning and that for *ROC* stronger. *Taiwan* continues to encompass passion, though not to any significant degree. Other than claiming, ‘Taiwan is our common mother’¹⁴ and ‘develop the spirit of Taiwan’, *taiwan* is used almost exclusively as a *geographic* designator or governmental entity. In phrases such as ‘Taiwan’s politico-economic order’; ‘Taiwan’s international competitiveness’; and ‘Taiwan’s Bill of Rights’,¹⁵ one senses a diminishing ardor. This rhetoric is in line with measures Chen adopted during his first year in office to tackle numerous challenges. Internally, his recruiting KMT member Tang Fei to serve as Prime Minister to increase support beyond DPP only lasted less than 100 days and he must continue to work with a less than friendly majority KMT legislature; externally, he tried to extend friendly gestures toward China by lessening restrictions on mutual financial investments, and so on, to avoid confrontation and criticism from Taiwan’s unificationists, as well as China and the United States. All the while Chen has struggled to escape from economic recession.

Notice how the following phrase positions *taiwan* and *ROC* in a relationship the reverse of that in other speeches: ‘The government and people of the ROC have consistently united to overcome adversities, so we can now enjoy economic prosperity and establish a superb model for international economic development’. Similar to the 2000 National Day Speech, the rhetoric once used to apply to *taiwan* now is used for *ROC*: ‘The Republic of China endured extreme hardships in the early years after its founding . . . The ROC then created a “political miracle” with the peaceful transfer of power, which brought the twentieth century to a perfect close and opened a bright future for this new century’. Chen declares Taiwan must ‘. . . set the ROC as the new standard for human rights in the twenty-first century’. As a president for only seven months, Chen must face not only his supporters but also the nearly 50% of the population who continue to endorse *ROC*. As Wang and Liu’s (2004) survey shows, although over 80% of people in Taiwan endorse Taiwan-centered political identities, only a quarter see Taiwanese culture as different from Chinese culture. This complex identification – politically rejecting, yet culturally accepting, the *sinic* world – seems to be particularly prominent in National Day speeches, as they mark the transition from Japanese to Nationalist, and hence Chinese, rule.

Eventually, however, the essence of *ROC* is inextricably connected to the conception of *taiwan*: ‘Let us work together for a brighter future for our nation’s

23 million [Taiwanese]¹⁶ people in the twenty-first century' (Chen, 2001a). The ambiguity in defining Taiwan – whether it should be 'Taiwan spirit' or 'ROC spirit', for example – is an effective way to handle contradictions among audiences of different sectors (Paine, 1981).

The 2002 New Year's Day speech (Chen, 2002a), which contains only one reference to *taiwan* and three to *ROC*, is another anomaly. This is the only speech examined in this study that has only one occurrence of *taiwan* as a political entity. Chen admits that, given such events as the 9/11 tragedy, economic recession, and China's continual threat to Taiwan, the nation experienced more adversity at home and abroad. In addition, the 2001 elections for city and county mayors, and legislators, while giving DPP the right to claim to be the largest party in Taiwan, still gave the pan-green supporters a smaller share of the legislature and continued to make Chen's government a less potent minority. Rigger (2003) notes, 'Chen's first 18 months in office were marred by nonstop political combat and policy paralysis' (p. 41). Lacking enthusiasm for *taiwan*, Chen's treatment of *ROC* fares no better. Similar to the 2001 and 2002 National Day speeches, Chen adopts a straightforward tone, using *ROC* to mark the occasion and as part of ending good wishes.

Chen's plans to move toward the middle did not pay off, however. Internally, the fact that KMT won the majority in the legislature enabled them to continue to resist and indeed nearly paralyse many governmental proposals. Externally, China continued to use military threats to force Taiwan into accepting the 'One China' policy, by increasing the number of missiles placed along the coast across from Taiwan. With Taiwan continuing to democratize and with the urge to seek an identity of its own growing stronger, in August 2002, Chen started to craft the now famous statement, 'Taiwan and China, one country on each side', paving the way for further enhancement of the symbol *Taiwan*, particularly in preparation for 2004's coming re-election.

The speeches from 2003 through 2007 (Chen, 2003a, 2004a, 2005a, 2006a, 2007a) share the pattern of prioritising *taiwan* at the expense of *ROC*. *ROC* is given 'lip service', used formulaically in the usual places; apart from these appearances, it is used occasionally and only concerning the national character of *ROC*, as in, 'ROC as a member in the international society ...' (2003a); and 'The Republic of China is an independent sovereign country ...' (2004a). In these speeches, *taiwan* appears far more frequently, with much compassion for the land and its people. Chen's persona as native son reaches a peak with the repetition of *taiwan* – almost twice as many as those contained in the 2003 speech – an important tactic given the imminent president election to be held later the same year:

We will spare no effort to actively participate in the world community and to fulfill our role as a democratic Taiwan, a peace-loving Taiwan, a prosperous Taiwan, a benevolent Taiwan. With unwavering determination and resolve, the 23 million people of Taiwan stand ready to prove to the world that Taiwan is in fact 'not a problem', rather, an inspiring success story.

(Chen, 2004a)

In December 2004, Chen pledged, within a period of two years, to rectify the names of all relevant government agencies, state-run enterprises, and overseas missions to include *taiwan*. Negotiating with host countries to allow rectification, Chen argued, might help lessen confusion between Taiwan and the PRC. Minister of

Foreign Affairs Mark Chen was quoted as saying, 'It is the will of the people of Taiwan to rectify the names of the country's overseas representative offices. Taiwan, as a democratic country, has to take its people's will into account'. He also claimed that changing the names of Taiwan's overseas representative offices had nothing to do with changing the cross-strait status quo or the national title, ROC (Chen & Ko, 2004). In the eyes of the opposition party, such measures seem little more than campaign tactics utilizing *taiwan* to gain votes from natives of Taiwan.

However, all this changed with the 2004 legislative elections, in which the DPP failed to gain majority support, resulting in a divided government. Hoping to make more friendly gestures and avoid controversy, the DPP postponed the amendment to the Referendum Law and name rectification. This prompted their allies, the TSU, to criticise DPP for backing away from its principles. DPP retorted that in order to achieve success with name rectification, they must seek cross-party accord by inviting cooperation with the pro-unificationist PFP (Wu, 2005). It is revealing that the Executive Yuan, in a surprise move on 11 January 2005, decided to remove a special report about rectifying names of government agencies from its weekly agenda (*Taiwan Quick Take*, 2005). These circumstances may explain why the 2005 New Year's Day speech (Chen, 2005a) actually contained fewer mentions of *taiwan* than the 2004 New Year's Day speech; most significantly, it reduced from just three months previous the 2004 National Day Rally's fifty appearances down to a mere 29.

Later, Chen signed a ten-point consensus with the strong unificationist PFP Chairman Soong on 25 February 2005, acknowledging *ROC* as the 'most common denominator' for Taiwan (Hong & Huang, 2005), an act that infuriated many pan-green supporters. Many interpret Chen's changing position as a political move to mediate the difficulties DPP was experiencing as a ruling minority party. The altered position of Chen and the DPP over rectification confirms the necessity for skillful political maneuvering and the importance of rhetoric in Taiwan's political climate. Given that Taiwanese handed his party a defeat in the 2004 legislative election, Chen recognised the flux of sentiment and chose the option of political survival.

Nevertheless, despite these seeming inconsistencies and fluctuating positions, the website for the president's office modified the official title in the home page banner (in both English and Chinese versions) from 'Republic of China' to 'Republic of China (Taiwan)'. The official explanation for this significant change is that government officials wished to avoid having site visitors confuse Taiwan with the People's Republic of China, and furthermore, that the change was not intended for other governmental units. Yet as we have seen through Chen's manipulation of the symbol *taiwan* in his speeches, it is a declaration, if not of Taiwan's independence, at least of the legitimacy of its view of its own destiny.

As the tide has turned, and with apparently no success in getting more support from the legislature from his coalition with Soong, Chen has again changed his position – at least symbolically. While pledging not to abolish the Guidelines for National Unification or the National Unification Council in both his 2000 and 2004 inaugural speeches, Chen eventually announced that, since the premises were violated by China's imposition of anti-secession laws in 2005, the Guidelines no longer held and the Council 'ceased' to function in February 2006. The word 'cease' was carefully chosen to replace the original 'abolish' – in response to the criticism by the United States – so that Chen will not be seen as violating his 'five no's' pledge.

Chen thus again enacted a more Taiwan-centred perspective and pushing *ROC* further toward the periphery, arousing severe criticism from KMT and PFP. In the 2006 New Year's Day speech (Chen, 2006a) *taiwan* was mentioned 64 times, and *ROC* is mentioned only twice, as a marker of the calendar and in the text when Chen discussed how China has tried to annihilate *ROC*. In this speech, Chen also laments, 'it is grievously saddening that circumstances forbid us from saying out loud consistently the name of our country – such is indeed a heartbreaking and humiliating predicament'. The name of the country is not *ROC*, as we consider the following words portraying Taiwan's future, not *ROC*'s future,

Our country, Taiwan, has a total land area of 36,000 square kilometers. The sovereignty of Taiwan belongs to its 23 million people, not to the People's Republic of China. Only the people of Taiwan have the right to decide Taiwan's future.

(Chen, 2006a)

In the 2007 New Year's Day speech (Chen, 2007a), only once was *ROC* mentioned as a marker of the calendar while *taiwan* appeared a total of 53 times. In light of the 2008 presidential election that many deem another historical moment in determining whether Taiwan will go back to a more authoritarian regime represented by KMT, Chen continues to promote the symbol *taiwan*.

Throughout these speeches, references to the *ROC* continue to dwindle. Speeches delivered in 2005 and 2006 invoking *ROC* were all responses to China: 'We once again urge the CCP authorities not to underestimate the will of Taiwan people in defending the sovereignty, security and dignity of the Republic of China' (2005a); and 'Following China's so-called "annihilation" of the Republic of China in 1949, it has unceasingly pursued its ambition to annex Taiwan' (Chen, 2006a). As China continues to contest Taiwan's claim as a sovereign entity, political leaders such as Chen are prompted to offer *taiwan* as a new identity category (see Laitin, 1998). In both 2007 and 2008, *ROC* is mentioned only once: in the 2007 speech, at the beginning marking the *ROC* calendar (Chen, 2007a) and in the 2008 speech, when Chen discussed how China has tried to extinguish *ROC* (Chen, 2008). That *ROC* almost vanishes is supported by concrete statistics, as Chen states, '... over 70% approved of applying for UN membership under the name Taiwan. This demonstrates that Taiwan-centric consciousness, based on the core value of putting Taiwan first, is coming into full bloom' (Chen, 2007a).

Chen continues to claim that using the name *taiwan* to enter the United Nations does not involve any changes in Taiwan's national title *ROC*, an effort that has again provoked criticism from both China and United States. With Taiwan's plan to apply for UN membership under both the name *taiwan* (in the DPP proposal) and *ROC* (in the KMT proposal), the United States has declared that neither Taiwan nor the Republic of China is a state in the international community, leaving the issue undecided (Snyder, 2007). Ironically, the US claim that neither *ROC* nor *taiwan* can be considered a country gives Chen further incentive to endorse the term *taiwan*, as *ROC* has in effect been finally pronounced dead by Taiwan's closest ally. With both referenda failing in the March 2008 election, attention should now turn to how discourse about *taiwan* will continue be articulated by DPP as well as by KMT.

Taiwanese identity in Presidential speeches: concluding remarks

The rhetorical construction of Taiwan's national identities is a collaborative affair, a fact Chen was forced to acknowledge as he navigated the perilous waters of Taiwan politics during his two-term tenure. In his speeches, Chen manages to elevate the symbol *taiwan* and provide at least this measure of stability in the face of fluctuating sociopolitical currents. In each type of speech, Chen faces unique rhetorical exigencies in alternating between the names *taiwan* and *ROC*; they must face up not only to unique challenges internal to Taiwan, but also pressure from China, the United States, and other countries.

Chen's addresses increasingly construct *taiwan* as designator of the island. Cook (2005) notes, 'Since 2000, the Democratic Progressive Party has used executive power to institutionalize Taiwan's new, autonomous identity from China and to align Taiwan's official nation-building process with the new view of Taiwan' (p. 87). Rejection of *ROC*, however, involves rejecting oneself in search of a new identity, a challenging task not all people in Taiwan seem willing to undertake. Given that different segments of Taiwan's population hold alternative views of its history and destiny, Taiwan becomes a site for conflict over naming practices. Chen's attempt to jettison *ROC* must therefore be cloaked in acts holding the *ROC* symbol in some esteem, an exigent rhetorical act that must be handled ingeniously in his public speeches.

Chen's strategy appears to be working well during his first term, as his support moves from 39% in 2000 up to just a little over 50% in the 2004 presidential election. However, as he continues to promote *taiwan* – as observed through an increased number of instances of the word *taiwan*, as well as more discourse about Taiwan in his speeches – the trend turned down during his second term, as confirmed by the loss of both the legislative and presidential elections in 2008. While Taiwanese consciousness by no means lessened from Chen's first term, the complicating factor of Taiwan's declining economy, as well as KMT's self-promotion of its party as also representing a Taiwan-centered consciousness, means that Chen's rhetoric about Taiwan carried much less weight. Many commentators attribute DPP's loss to Chen's over-exuberance in capitalizing on *taiwan* and have called for Chen to go beyond Taiwanese ethnicity (Li, 2008).

Acts of naming are established according to a host of variables – political ideologies, foreign relations, national identities and pride, and so on. The realities of political survival also mean that what is declared by a player in Taiwan's politics, whether the president or others, is itself subject to revision. In earlier times, *taiwan* was pushed out by the KMT even as *ROC* was denied and rendered powerless by China and other countries. Presently, *taiwan* has been endorsed enthusiastically by the DPP but also by the KMT, whereas *ROC* has been endorsed primarily by the KMT, though somewhat reluctantly by the DPP.

Nor does the struggle over these terms seem likely to end. Just as people were becoming accustomed to seeing KMT endorse a 'One-China' policy, in contrast to the DPP's stated quest for Taiwan's self-determination, such binary thinking is no longer seen as politically viable. Although DPP has in the past demanded Taiwan's independence, it has changed its position to accommodate the majority view that the optimal strategy is to maintain the status quo and then change back to independence again. DPP's altered rhetoric claiming Taiwan as a *de facto* independent country

(hence, no need to push for independence) stirred up as much confusion as KMT's emphasis on local consciousness. Former President Lee Teng-hui, since leaving KMT, has strongly advocated Taiwan's independence and has served as 'spiritual leader' to the fiercely pro-independence TSU. Long an ally of DPP, in the 2008 presidential election Lee did not publicly support DPP's presidential candidate Hsieh until just a few days before the election, an act that led many to suspect that his pro-Taiwan position had changed. President-elect Ma has also changed his position from eventual unification with China to self-determination.

Adding to the complex layers of meaning is the role played by China, who objects to the use of *taiwan* as the nation's title, since to them it represents the Taiwanese attempt to separate itself from 'the motherland'. As to the official title *ROC*, China also objects to its use, since it represents a government that violates China's 'One China' policy, even though the ROC still remains more connected to the sinic world than to *taiwan*. Meanwhile, the United States, while abiding by the 'One China' policy, always addresses Taiwan as *taiwan*; it is only recently that, responding to Taiwan's proposals to enter UN, the US has refused to support entry under either of its two names. With the failure of both referenda on using either the name *taiwan* or *ROC* to enter the United Nations, and given that China is likely to resume negotiation with the pro-China KMT president-elect Ma, it will be interesting to see how *taiwan* and *ROC* will reconfigure themselves in conflict with each other.

These actions, along with changing stances assumed by various political parties and politicians, continue to alter the shape of diverse problems, whose boundaries at one time would have made it seem that they could never be combined to create a coherent picture of Taiwan's identity (see Chen et al., 2004). Such findings point to the difficulty of trying to get a grip on the flux of Taiwan's changing national identity. The need for adjustment highlights how skilled politicians must in their rhetoric accommodate and manage changing circumstances, since declarative statements may someday be rendered unviable. Although use of names can serve to articulate the position of a president and his/her party, the meanings of those names must be actualised in the rough and tumble of real political life. Although after the 2008 presidential election Taiwan-centeredness seems no longer the exclusive property of the DPP, with the population continuing to be divided, what name is best suited for Taiwan is likely to continue to be an open question. Regardless of *how* names for Taiwan are used, there is no question that the importance of naming will continue to be a key feature in the negotiation of power, ideology, and political realities.

Notes on contributors

Hui-Ching Chang (PhD, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1994) is Associate Professor of Communication at the University of Illinois at Chicago. Her research focuses on intercultural communication, especially relationship issues. More recently, she explores Taiwanese national identity as constituted through various communicative practices. Her publications have appeared in *Discourse Studies*, *Research on Language and Social Interaction*, *Journal of Language and Social Psychology*, *Journal of Asian Pacific Communication*, and *International and Intercultural Communication Annuals*.

Rich Holt (PhD, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1994) is Associate Professor of Communication at Northern Illinois University. His research focuses on organizational communication across cross-cultural boundaries, and new media in organizational settings.

His published work includes *Dialogue on the Internet* (Praeger, 2004), and contributions to scholarly journals, including *Critical Studies in Mass Communication*, *Current Anthropology*, and *Mediation Quarterly*.

Notes

1. According to Taiwan's Referendum Law, for a referendum to be valid, more than 50% of eligible voters need to cast a ballot, and 50% of these need to respond in the affirmative (Lu, 2008). Many criticized the thresholds as too high, rendering it almost impossible for any referendum to be passed.
2. It is evident that the imposition of such categories represents something of an oversimplification. However, these categories do represent the basic orientations of the two camps and their associated rhetoric.
3. While the Chinese Lunar New Year is marked by a short talk by the president, the New Year's Day speech (Western calendar) is an official, routine, ceremonial presidential speech.
4. People in Taiwan tend to suspect the sincerity of beautiful words, even as they acknowledge their usefulness. It is widely thought that speaking and actions are not necessarily correspondent, reflecting a cultural belief that prompted Confucius to argue that one's words must be realized in one's actions (Chang, 1997, 2001b).
5. This study used the original Chinese text to count words. The President's Office also publishes English versions of selected speeches. It should be noted that, due to the idiosyncrasies of translation, Chinese and English versions do not contain the same number of target words.
6. These English versions were also consulted in the analysis. In a few instances, English translations published by the government were not used, since these do not convey the subtleties of the Chinese language. A good example is the phrase, '*Taiwan – women yongyuan de muqin*', translated as 'Taiwan – our motherland forever'. A direct translation would be, 'Taiwan – our forever mother' (speech delivered on 18 March 2000). 'Motherland' in Chinese is *zuguó*, rather than *muqin* (mother).
7. The *Guidelines of National Unification* was implemented in 1991 and in line with the ROC Constitution, *zhongguó* is used to refer to a future state, a country populated by 'all Chinese.'
8. The 'One China' policy proposed by China is thus also a constitutional problem the ROC in Taiwan's political reality is different from the ROC as proscribed by its Constitution (United News Editorial, 2000).
9. To permit easy identification of Chinese characters, the romanization for this and other songs in Taiwanese dialect is based upon Chinese Mandarin.
10. The lyrics are translated from the following website: <http://icool.myweb.hinet.net/love-Taiwan.htm> [accessed 17 January 2005].
11. A year later, police identified the gunman as Yi-xiong Chen, who committed suicide a week after the shooting, a report that many 'pan-blue' supporters did not believe.
12. On one occasion Chen said, 'When people [from other countries] hear the name *ROC*, they are going to ask, "What is this thing?"' His derogatory remarks concerning *ROC* generated severe criticism from opposition parties.
13. In the English translation (Chen, 2000c), the 'it' here is rendered as 'Taiwan'. In the original Chinese text, no pronoun (whether *taiwan* or *ROC*) is used since Chinese sentences do not necessarily need a subject. We adopted the original Chinese text.
14. Here we do not adopt the official translation, which renders the phrase, 'Taiwan is our motherland' (Chen, 2001a). We believe our translation is closer to the meaning of the original Chinese text.
15. The official English version (Chen, 2001a) renders this phrase as 'ROC's Bill of Rights'; again, the original is used here.
16. The official English version (Chen, 2001a) does not contain the word 'Taiwanese', though the Chinese version does.

References

- Anderson, B. (1983). *Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*. New York: Verso.
- Azaryahu, M. (1997). German reunification and the politics of street names: The case of East Berlin. *Political Geography*, 16(6), 479–493.
- Bakhtin, M.M. (1986). *Speech genres and other late essays* (V. McGee, Trans.; C. Emerson & M. Holquist, Eds.) Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Bitzer, L. (1968). The rhetorical situation. *Philosophy and Rhetoric*, 1968(1), 1–14.
- Branham, R. J. (1999). God Save the ___!: American national songs and national identities, 1760–1798. *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 85, 17–37.
- Bruner, M. L. (2000). Strategies of remembrance in pre-unification West Germany. *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 86(1), 86–107.
- Campbell, K. K. & Jamieson, K. H. (1990). *Deeds done in words*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Canovan, M. (1996). *Nationhood and political theory*. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
- Ceaser, J. W., Thurow, G. E., Tulis, J. & Bessette, J. M. (1982). The rise of the rhetorical presidency. In T. E. Cronin (Ed.), *Rethinking the presidency* (pp. 233–51). Boston: Little, Brown and Company.
- Chang, B.-y. (2004). From Taiwanisation to de-sinification: Cultural construction in Taiwan since the 1990s. *China Perspectives*, 56, 34–44.
- Chang, H.-c. (1997). Language and words: Communication in the Analects of Confucius. *Journal of Language and Social Psychology*, 16(2), 107–31.
- Chang, H.-c. (2001a). From ‘orphan of Asia’ to ‘Moses coming out of Egypt’: A metaphorical analysis of the transformation of Taiwan’s political identity. In M. J. Collier (Ed.), *Transforming communication about culture: Critical new directions* (pp. 25–59). [International and Intercultural Communication Annual, Vol. xxiv]. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
- Chang, H.-c. (2001b). Harmony as performance: The turbulence under Chinese interpersonal communication. *Discourse Studies*, 3(2), 155–179.
- Chao, C.-m. (2003). Will economic integration between Mainland China and Taiwan lead to congenial political culture? *Asian Survey*, 43(2), 280–304.
- Chen, M., & Ko, S.-l. (2004, 8 December). Taiwan is but a lamb and China is a rogue: MOFA spokesman. *Taipei Times*. Retrieved 10 January 2005, from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2004/12/08/2003214203>
- Chen, T.-L. (2002). Current status of studies of Taiwanese national identification [*taiwan de guojia rentong yanjiu jinkuang*]. *The Academia Historica Journal New Series*, 33, 1–8.
- Chen, Y.-s., Xue, H.-y., Li, M.-j. & Hu, Q.-s. (2004). *History and theory of Taiwan’s national position* [*taiwan guojia dingwei de lishi yu lilun*]. Taipei: Yushanshe.
- China warns Taiwan to drop independence move. (2004, 17 May). *The New York Times*. Retrieved 10 October 2007, from query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A0DE6D8143FF934A25756C0A9629C8B63
- Chiu, Y.-t. (2005, 3 August). Chen says name variance is simply an expedient. *Taipei Times*. Retrieved 10 August 2005, from www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2005/08/03/2003266196
- Cho, H.-w. (2002). *Taiwan’s application to GATT/WTO: Significance of multilateralism for an unrecognized state*. Westport, CN: Praeger.
- Chuang, Y.-c. (2001). Taiwanese identity in a global/local context: The use and abuse of national consciousness in Taiwan. In C. Aspalter (Ed.), *Understanding modern Taiwan: Essays in economics, politics and social policy* (pp. 53–66). Aldershot, England: Ashgate.
- Cohen, J. E. (1995). Presidential rhetoric and the public agenda. *American Journal of Political Science*, 39(1), 87–107.
- Comments on the substance of Chen Shui-bien’s May 20 inaugural speech [*lun chen shuibian wu er ling jiuzhi yanshuo de biaoli xushi*]. (2004, 21 May). *World Journalism*. Retrieved 5 October 2007, from www.tangben.com/WYluntan/News/tt0521.htm
- Cook, M. (2005). Taiwan’s identity challenge. *SAIS Review*, 25(2), 83–92.

- Editorial. (2000, 7 May). Interpreting the Constitution of the Republic of China: Observing 'One China' from 'five China's' [*jiedu zhonghuaminguo xianfa: cong 'wuge zhongguo' kan 'yige zhongguo'*]. *United News*. Retrieved 20 June 2005, from udndata.com.
- Editorial. (2007, 11 October). Last National Day talk in his last year: Chen refrained from calling ROC [*rennai zuihou tanhua, bian bu ti zhonghuaminguo*]. *United News*. Retrieved 15 October 2007, from udndata.com.
- Election Study Center (2007). *Taiwanese/Chinese identification trend distribution in Taiwan (1992/06–2007/06)*. Taiwan: National Chengchi University. Retrieved 25 September 2007, from esc.nccu.edu.tw/eng/data/data03-2.htm
- Ensink, T. (1997). The footing of a royal address: An analysis of representativeness in political speech, exemplified in Queen Beatrix' address to the Knesset on 28 March, 1995. In C. Schäffner (Ed.), *Analysing political speeches* (pp. 5–32). Clevedon, England: Multilingual Matters Ltd.
- Fairclough, N. (1989). *Language and power*. London: Longman.
- Fairclough, N. (1992). Introduction. In N. Fairclough (Ed.), *Critical language analysis*. London: Longman.
- Galasinski, D. & Skowronek, N. (2001). Naming the nation: A critical analysis of names in Polish political discourse. *Political Communication*, 18, 51–66.
- General Assembly. (2007, 21 September). *General Assembly adopts work programme for sixty-second session, rejects bid to include agenda item on Taiwan*. Retrieved 20 October 2007, from www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/ga10617.doc.htm
- Hayden, S. (2003). Family metaphors and the nation: Promoting a politics of care through the Million Mom March. *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 89(3), 196–215.
- Holt, R. (2004). *Dialogue on the Internet: Language, civic identity and computer-mediated communication*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Hong, C. (2005, 15 March). Pan blues say 'ROC' offers best way to avoid conflict. *Taipei Times*. Retrieved 25 June 2005, from www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2005/03/15/2003246331
- Hong, C., & Huang, T. L. (2005, 25 February). Chen, Soong sign 10-point consensus. *Taipei Times*. Retrieved 4 March 2005, from www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2005/02/25/2003224466
- Horowitz, S. & Tan., C. A. (2005). The strategic logic of Taiwanization. *World Affairs*, 168(2), 87–95.
- Huang, T.-L. (2005, 21 May). President celebrates by recycling. *Taipei Times*. Retrieved 20 June 2005, from www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2005/05/21/2003256005
- Kahn, J., & Buckley, C. (2004, 21 May). Taiwan's President tones down his pro-independence oratory. *The New York Times*. Retrieved 10 October 2007, from query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9502E1DA113FF932A15756C0A9629C8B63
- Kiewe, A. (1998). The crisis tool in American political discourse. In O. Feldman & C. de Landtsheer (Eds), *Politically speaking* (pp. 79–90). Westport, CN: Praeger.
- Laitin, D. D. (1998). *Identity in formation*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- de Landtsheer, C. (1998). The political rhetoric of a unified Europe. In O. Feldman & C. de Landtsheer (Eds), *Politically speaking* (pp. 129–145). Westport, CN: Praeger.
- Li, L-w. (2008, March 27). Beyond ethnicity [*chaoyue minzhu zhuyi*]. *Liberty Times*. Retrieved 27 March 2008, from <http://www.libertytimes.com.tw/2008/new/mar/27/today-o5.htm#>
- Li, X.-f. (2004). *Xiao-feng Li column [lixiaofeng zhuanlan]*. Taipei: New Naturalism, Inc.
- Lu, P. (2008, 23 March). Presidential election 2008: Referendum: Referendums fail to meet thresholds. *Taipei Times*. Retrieved 24 March 2008, from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2008/03/23/2003406756>
- McDiarmid, J. (1937). Presidential inaugural addresses – a study in verbal symbols. *Public Opinions Quarterly*, 1, 79–82.
- Miller, N. L., & Stiles, W. B. (1986). Verbal familiarity in American presidential nomination acceptance speeches and inaugural addresses (1920–1981). *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 49(1), 72–81.
- Miroff, B. (1982). Monopolizing the public space: The president as a problem for democratic politics. In T. Cronin (Ed.), *Rethinking the presidency* (pp. 218–232). Boston, MA: Little, Brown.

- National Day speech, Bien replaced ROC with taiwan. (2007, 11 October). *Liberty Times*. Retrieved 27 October 2007, from www.libertytimes.com.tw/2007/new/oct/11/today-fo1.htm
- Paine, R. (1981). When saying is doing. In R. Paine (Ed.), *Politically speaking: Cross-cultural studies of rhetoric* (pp. 9–24). Philadelphia, PA: Institute for the Study of Human Issues.
- Ragsdale, L. (1987). Presidential speechmaking and the public audience: Individual presidents and group attitudes. *The Journal of Politics*, 49(3), 704–36.
- Rigger, S. (2003). Taiwan in 2002: Another year of political droughts and typhoons. *Asian Survey*, 43(1), 41–8.
- Ruddick, S. (1995). *Maternal thinking: Toward a politics of peace*. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
- Sauer, C. (1997). Echoes from abroad – Speeches for the domestic audience: Queen Beatrix' address to the Israeli Parliament. In C. Schäffner (Ed.), *Analysing political speeches* (pp. 33–67). Clevedon, England: Multilingual Matters Ltd.
- Snyder, C. (2007, 1 September). ROC statehood undecided: US official. *Taipei Times*. Retrieved 5 October 2007, from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2007/09/01/2003376690>
- Taiwan quick take (2005, 12 January). *Taipei Times*. Retrieved 13 January 2005, from www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2005/01/12/2003219045.
- Tulis, J. K. (1987). *The rhetorical presidency*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Wang, T. Y. & Liu, I.-c. (2004). Contending identities in Taiwan: Implications for cross-strait relations. *Asian Survey*, 44(4), 568–90.
- West, E. (2002). Selling Canada to Canadians: Collective memory, national identity, and popular culture. *Critical Studies in Media Communication*, 19(2), 212–29.
- Wu, D. (2005). TSU slams DPP for 'selling out'. *Taipei Times*. Retrieved 13 January 2005, from www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2005/01/13/2003219181
- Wu, Y.-s. (2001). Taiwan in 2001: Stalemated on all fronts. *Asian Survey*, 42(1), 29–38.

Speeches consulted

Chinese versions of these speeches were downloaded from the official site of the ROC Presidential office http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/docset/listC.php4?_section=4; their English versions were downloaded from http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/dore2+/listE.php4?_section=5&_path=../prez. Titles of these speeches adopt the English version, except for the speech by Chen (2001c) which has only a Chinese version.

- Chen, S.-b. (2000a, 18 March). Victory speech after the 10th Republic of China Presidential and Vice Presidential Election.
- Chen, S.-b. (2000b, 20 May). Inaugural Speech: Taiwan Stands Up: Toward the Dawn of a Rising Era.
- Chen, S.-b. (2000c, 10 October). President Chen's National Day Message.
- Chen, S.-b. (2000d, 10 October). Address to the National Day Rally.
- Chen, S.-b. (2000e, 31 December). President Chen's Cross-century Remarks.
- Chen, S.-b. (2001a, 1 January). President Chen's New Year Message.
- Chen, S.-b. (2001b, 10 October). President Chen's National Day Message.
- Chen, S.-b. (2001c, 10 October). *Zongtong zai jiushi nian guoqing dahui zhici* [Address to the 90th National Day Rally].
- Chen, S.-b. (2002a, 1 January). President Chen's New Year Message 'Meeting Challenges, Moving Forward'.
- Chen, S.-b. (2002b, 10 October). President Chen's National Day Message.
- Chen, S.-b. (2002c, 10 October). President Chen's Address to the National Day Rally.
- Chen, S.-b. (2003a, 1 January). President Chen's New Year's Day Message.
- Chen, S.-b. (2003b, 10 October). President Chen's National Day Message 'Faith in Democracy, Faith in Reform, Faith in Taiwan'.
- Chen, S.-b. (2003c, 10 October). President Chen's Address to the National Day Rally.
- Chen, S.-b. (2004a, 1 January). President Chen's New Year's Day Address.
- Chen, S.-b. (2004b, 20 May). President Chen's Inaugural Address 'Paving the Way for a Sustainable Taiwan'.
- Chen, S.-b. (2004c, 10 October). President Chen's National Day Message.

- Chen, S.-b. (2004d, 10 October). President Chen's Address to the National Day Rally.
- Chen, S.-b. (2005a, 1 January). President Chen's New Year's Day Address: 'Creating a New and Stable Environment for Consultation and Dialogue'.
- Chen, S.-b. (2005b, 10 October). President Chen's National Day Message.
- Chen, S.-b. (2005c, 10 October). President Chen's Address to the National Day Rally.
- Chen, S.-b. (2006a, 1 January). President Chen's New Year's Day Message.
- Chen, S.-b. (2006b, 10 October). President Chen's National Day Message.
- Chen, S.-b. (2006c, 10 October). President Chen's Address to the National Day Rally.
- Chen, S.-b. (2007a, 1 January). President Chen's New Year's Day Message.
- Chen, S.-b. (2007b, 10 October). President Chen's National Day Message.
- Chen, S.-b. (2008, 1 January). President Chen's New Year Message.

Copyright of *National Identities* is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.